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Real Insider Trading  
Michael A. Perino† 
Abstract  
In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling 
the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary 
investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered 
insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power 
and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with 
agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily 
resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The 
debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and 
conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses 
that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual 
defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to 
assess how enforcers operationalize insider trading doctrine. The 
cases enforcement authorities bring are shaped by a complex and 
cross-cutting set of institutional and individual incentives, 
cognitive biases, legal requirements, the history of failed 
enforcement efforts, and the way in which the agency and the 
self-regulatory organizations deploy their investigatory 
resources. SEC enforcement is dominated by small stakes, 
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opportunistic trading by mid-level employees and their friends 
and family, most often involving M&A transactions. Those cases 
settle quickly, half within thirty days of filing. Criminal 
enforcement is generally reserved for more serious cases, 
measured by, among other things, the type of defendant, the size 
of the insider trading network, and the profits earned. In both 
settings, there is little evidence that enforcers are systematically 
stretching the boundaries of insider trading doctrine.  
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I.  Introduction 
Early on a September morning in 2012, two FBI agents 
knocked on John Johnson’s door.1 Johnson, in his mid-forties, 
had been a securities market professional (SMP) for years, and 
was, at the time, the Chief Investment Officer for a public 
pension fund.2 The agents wanted to know about a trade he 
made in his personal account in July 2008.3 Just a few days 
before Brocade Communications, Inc. announced it was 
acquiring Foundry Networks, Inc., Johnson bought a small 
number of out-of-the-money Foundry call options and common 
shares.4 Foundry’s stock price rose 32 percent and Johnson 
made $136,000.5 Johnson admitted to the agents that he traded 
on material nonpublic information (MNPI) and agreed to 
cooperate in a criminal case brought against his immediate 
source, a hedge fund employee, and the original source of the 
information, Foundry’s Chief Information Officer.6 Johnson pled 
guilty7 and, due in part to his cooperation, was fined and given 
a suspended sentence.8 
I had the opportunity to interview Johnson, and I asked him 
why he traded and why he thought he could get away with it.9 
Recently divorced and unemployed, Johnson was desperate for 
money.10 But he also thought that prosecutors and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would not bother 
with him.11 Johnson believed that insider trading was endemic 
 
 1. See Telephone Interview with John Johnson (Mar. 29, 2019) 
(recounting the story). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Teeple, No. 13-cv-2010 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 
2013), ECF No. 1. 
 5. Id. ¶ 4. 
 6. Interview with John Johnson, supra note 1. 
 7. United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183, 191–92 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 8. Nate Raymond, Ex-Wyoming Fund Exec Turned Insider Trading 
Witness Avoids Prison, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2015, 4:12 PM), 
https://perma.cc/4V73-LE84 (PDF). 
 9. Interview with John Johnson, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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among professional traders and that far more prominent traders 
were exploiting this kind of information on a massive scale, far 
in excess of his one comparatively small trade.12 “I was,” he told 
me, “just a guy from Denver.”13 
Johnson’s impression of how and why enforcers target 
insider trading is not unusual. In popular rhetoric, insider 
trading prosecutions are about leveling the playing field and 
making markets fair for ordinary investors.14 The former United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet 
Bharara, whose office prosecuted Johnson, called insider 
traders “cheaters” who “rigged” the market, and he vowed to 
“investigate and prosecute this crime aggressively.”15 Insider 
trading rhetoric has always had a populist overtone, and 
Bharara saved special condemnation for the “most advantaged, 
privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern finance,” who violate 
the law to reap even greater wealth or to benefit “their friends 
and relatives at the expense of the trading public.”16 The SEC 
generally views insider trading enforcement as a core 
component of its investor protection mandate, leading SEC 
officials to similar promises.17 
Johnson’s confidence that enforcement authorities would 
not bother with his case was clearly wrong, at least in hindsight. 
But was he just unlucky, or did he fundamentally 
misunderstand how prosecutors and the SEC actually deploy 
their enforcement resources? 
That question is subject to a wide-ranging debate. Indeed, 
enforcement rhetoric is far removed from the critique of insider 
trading generally found on law review pages. While some argue 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Preet Bharara, The Future of White Collar Enforcement: A 
Prosecutor’s View, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/KR9J-EEV6 (last 
updated May 13, 2015) (explaining that the fight against white collar crime 
stems from a commitment to the principle that markets should be fair, playing 
fields should be level, and citizens’ accounts should be secure). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://perma.cc/XA4D-W5TD (last updated June 10, 2013) (including the 
investigation of insider trading among the important aspects of protecting 
investors). 
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that most forms of insider trading should be legal,18 much of the 
current criticism focuses on regulation and enforcement. Many 
commentators complain that Congress, largely for political 
expediency, has never defined it.19 Instead, insider trading is 
enforced through Section 10(b)’s catch-all antifraud provision,20 
leading to a doctrine that is poorly theorized and riddled with 
inconsistencies.21 To avoid a blueprint for fraud the SEC has 
eschewed bright-line rules,22 but critics charge this approach is 
more about maximizing agency power and discretion than it is 
about preventing clever insider trading schemes.23 “The result 
of executive agency ambiguity layered on top of congressional 
ambiguity,” one set of critics complained, “is judicial power to 
decide what is and what is not illegal,”24 which raises separation 
of powers, accountability, and due process concerns, especially 
in criminal prosecutions.25  
For legal academics, the doctrinal problems are legion. 
They fret over the uncertain parameters of materiality.26 They 
worry about the lack of clarity regarding which duties of trust 
and confidence are sufficient to give rise to an insider trading 
claim if breached27 or whether liability should be based on such 
 
 18. See generally JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
REFORM (2018). 
 19. See Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 129, 145–48 (2017). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 21. See Baer, supra note 19, at 138–45. 
 22. See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. 
Affs., 98th Cong. 35–38 (1984) (statement of John Fedders, Director, SEC 
Enforcement Division). 
 23. See Jonathan R. Macey, Deconstructing the Galleon Insider Trading 
Case, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/5TKY-7FXT (last updated Apr. 19, 2011). 
 24. M. Todd Henderson et al., Offensive Disclosure: How Voluntary 
Disclosure Can Increase Returns from Insider Trading, 103 GEO. L.J. 1275, 
1280 (2015). 
 25. See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and 
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 976–77 (2017); 
Baer, supra note 19, at 145–48.  
 26. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on 
Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2012). 
 27. See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 75–78. 
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duties.28 Much recent scholarship focuses on what if any benefit 
a tipper must receive in order to create liability for tippees.29 
And there is a general sense that enforcers have exploited these 
gaps and uncertainties to expand insider trading liability too 
far,30 a view occasionally reinforced in the popular press when 
enforcers target high-profile defendants.31 Some see civil and 
criminal enforcers as a tag-team, with the SEC and the judiciary 
liberally expanding the scope of liability in civil cases with lower 
burdens of proof and prosecutors exploiting those precedents to 
overreach in criminal ones.32 
But these critiques of aggressive and expansive litigation 
sit uncomfortably beside broader challenges to enforcement 
choices. Jonathan Macey and others argue that the SEC has 
strong institutional incentives to maximize the total number of 
cases brought and resolved and the penalties collected because 
congressional overseers tend to focus on those simple metrics to 
measure SEC effectiveness.33 The agency therefore goes after 
“low-hanging fruit;” it avoids difficult, time consuming cases 
against high-profile or well-resourced defendants in favor of 
easy ones that are likely to settle quickly.34 U.S. Attorneys have 
 
 28. See James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider 
Trading Through Texas Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 706 (2018); 
Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading 
After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1489 (2016). 
 29. See Baer, supra note 19, at 129–34; Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: 
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 48–51 (2016). 
 30. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64, 72 (2016) (“The government’s objection to the status 
quo as reflected in Dirks and Newman is not to the ambiguity of these 
decisions but rather to the restraints they impose on the government’s power 
and prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 31. See Jeff Cox, Leon Cooperman: SEC Insider Trading Case Was 
“Extraordinarily Abusive,” CNBC (May 30, 2017, 12:18 PM), 
https://perma.cc/5T8E-5SEY (last updated May 30, 2017, 2:34 PM). 
 32. See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider 
Trading, 69 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 55, 63 (2016). 
 33. Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 644, 646 
(2010); see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863–95 (2014). 
 34. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646–47.  
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been similarly criticized for their unwillingness to try cases 
unless they have overwhelming evidence of guilt.35 
None of these depictions seems entirely satisfying. 
Enforcement rhetoric is clearly overblown. Numerous 
high-profile targets have gone unprosecuted despite strong 
evidence of guilt while small traders, who are neither privileged 
nor wealthy, are frequently targeted. Pursuing expansive 
definitions of insider trading, particularly against 
well-resourced defendants, is a poor strategic choice for an 
agency bent on maximizing quick settlements as these cases are 
likely to be vigorously contested. And, while there are certainly 
ambiguities in insider trading law, are those ambiguities really 
any more substantial than the ambiguities found in mail and 
wire fraud or other white collar offenses?36 But beyond these 
generalities the fundamental problem in evaluating these 
competing claims is that we lack the data necessary to 
rigorously analyze them. 
What we know about law enforcement efforts typically 
comes from reported opinions and from journalistic accounts of 
prominent cases.37 While such sources are useful, they can be 
misleading for obtaining an accurate picture of real insider 
trading enforcement as it actually occurs on the ground. 
Doctrinal scholarship often devotes inordinate attention to the 
latest Supreme Court opinion or to cases with unusual fact 
patterns. Such scholarship can highlight otherwise obscure 
inconsistencies or doctrinal gaps, but without reliable data 
showing how those cases fit into the broader framework of 
insider trading enforcement, we run the risk that those lacunae 
 
 35. See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB 293 (2017). 
 36. See Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged? 63 
DUKE L.J. 823, 842–43 (2014). 
 37. See generally SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE (2017) (analyzing the 
governmental investigation of Steven A. Cohen’s hedge fund); CHARLES 
GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS (2013) (tracing the prosecution of several 
high-profile insider trading cases); JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) 
(exploring insider trading scandals of the 1980s). A few studies have provided 
some limited descriptive statistics of insider trading enforcement. See, e.g., 
Chien Chung Lin & Eric Hung, U.S. Insider Trading Law Enforcement: Issues 
and Survey of SEC Actions from 2009 to 2013, 11 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 37, 
54–65 (2016) (analysis of insider trading enforcement from 2009 through 
2013). 
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will assume outsized importance in academic and policy 
debates. Examining how SEC enforcement officials and 
prosecutors operationalize insider trading doctrine allows 
scholars and legislators to evaluate more reliably whether 
enforcers consistently overreach or under-enforce.38 
Relying on a hand-collected sample of 465 individual 
defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions, this 
article separates the myths and the realities of insider trading 
enforcement. Who actually gets targeted in insider trading 
enforcement actions? What kinds of MNPI are typically at 
issue? What kinds of duties tend to give rise to enforcement 
actions? What if any significant differences exist between civil 
and criminal enforcement? While my goals are thus largely 
descriptive, I do offer explanations for the observed enforcement 
patterns and reveal previously undisclosed information about 
the SEC’s own internal analyses of the effectiveness of its 
surveillance techniques. 
There is little evidence that enforcers are systematically 
stretching the boundaries of insider trading doctrine. For 
example, there is little doubt about the significance of the MNPI 
typically at issue. More than 93 percent of cases involve one of 
three types: information about impending M&A transactions; 
unannounced quarterly or other financial results; and 
unannounced results from pharmaceutical or other medical 
product trials.39 Two-thirds of cases involve straightforward 
breaches of duty, most typically arising from employment or 
other traditional fiduciary relationships.40 There are few remote 
tippees targeted in enforcement actions.41 Over 70 percent of 
defendants are either the original source of the information or a 
first level tippee.42 When remote tippees are targeted they 
typically obtain the information directly from the first level 
 
 38. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1131–38 (2016) (calling for greater scrutiny of 
enforcement discretion); Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1049–51 (2013) (same). 
 39. See infra Table 2. 
 40. See infra Table 1. 
 41. See infra Part VII.D. 
 42. See infra Table 10. 
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tippee.43 Overall, 92 percent of defendants fall into one of these 
categories.44 
Naturally, one can find counterexamples, especially in civil 
actions alleging non-traditional duties of trust and confidence 
and occasionally with respect to materiality.45 But these cases 
are the outliers not the norm. Most cases fall squarely into what 
the Supreme Court recently called the “heartland” of insider 
trading doctrine.46 There are certainly enforcement issues that 
could benefit from more precise statutory language, but the data 
give little reason to believe that Congress should legislate to 
curb overly aggressive enforcement.47 
The observable enforcement patterns also reveal much 
about how enforcers operate. These data suggest that the cases 
SEC and criminal enforcement authorities bring are shaped by 
a complex and sometimes cross-cutting set of institutional and 
individual incentives, cognitive biases, legal requirements, the 
history of failed enforcement efforts, and the way in which the 
agency and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) deploy 
their resources to identify improper trades.48 There is a good 
deal of evidence suggesting that SEC enforcement is dominated 
by easy cases that settle quickly.49 Nearly half of civil 
enforcement actions settle within thirty days of filing.50 Median 
direct profits in these cases—which are often against mid-level 
employees or their friends and family—are less than $50,000, 
not the millions typically trumpeted in enforcement rhetoric.51 
 
 43. See infra Part VII.D. 
 44. See infra Table 10. 
 45. See infra Parts V–VI. 
 46. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016). 
 47. Legislative fixes could beneficially close some gaps in existing 
doctrine. For example, proposed legislation defines outright theft of MNPI, 
such as through computer hacking schemes, as insider trading. See SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to determine 
whether a fraudulent misrepresentation in a computer hacking scheme was 
“deceptive” for the purposes of § 10(b)); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 
2534, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to explicitly codify a ban on insider 
trading). 
 48. See infra Part III. 
 49. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra Table 7. 
 51. See infra Table 11. 
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Rather than being a mechanism for leveling the playing field 
between elite market participants and retail investors, insider 
trading, especially on the civil side, turns out to be a 
middle-class violation.52 
The prevalence of these actions raises important questions 
about whether civil enforcement can effectively deter 
sophisticated insider trading schemes. Indeed, a previously 
undisclosed SEC analysis found that existing surveillance 
techniques were adequate to identify this kind of opportunistic 
trading but sometimes missed coordinated trading among 
sophisticated SMP.53 While the SEC has altered some of its 
surveillance techniques to try to rectify these problems, its 
docket continues to be shaped as much by the agency’s inability 
to try large numbers of cases and individual attorneys’ biases 
toward low risk matters as they are by attempts to pad 
statistics. There are, as well, systematic differences between 
cases with and without criminal enforcement—criminal 
enforcement is generally reserved for more serious cases, 
measured by, among other things the type of defendant, the size 
of the insider trading network, and the profits earned.54 But like 
civil cases, the criminal cases tend to be those in which liability 
is fairly certain. 
There is a simple and obvious explanation for these 
patterns. On both the individual and institutional level 
enforcers want to win and bringing novel or uncertain cases 
increases the chances they will not. For example, the SEC lost 
more than 16 percent of cases against tippees more than two 
steps removed from the source compared to just 6.5 percent of 
cases against other defendants.55 Courts thus appear to act as 
an effective check on enforcement overreach, one to which the 
SEC is highly responsive. After the Second Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Newman,56 which made it harder to pursue 
actions against remote tippees, the SEC did not bring a single 
 
 52. See infra Table 11. 
 53. Telephone Interview with Daniel M. Hawke, Former SEC 
Enforcement Official (July 1, 2019) [hereinafter “Hawke Interview”]. 
 54. See infra Part VII.F. 
 55. See infra Part VII.D. 
 56. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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action against a tippee more than two steps removed from the 
source during the remainder of the study period.57 Courts, 
enforcers, and defense counsel are engaged in an ongoing dialog 
that both limits the expansive application of insider trading 
doctrine and generates the kind of interstitial, dynamic 
lawmaking that would be difficult for Congress to provide. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II begins by 
sketching in more detail the rhetoric of insider trading 
enforcement. Part III describes the institutional and individual 
incentives enforcers face when they operationalize their 
enforcement strategies. Part IV describes the dataset. Part V 
discusses how materiality is defined in litigated cases. Part VI 
examines the duties of trust and confidence at issue in filed 
enforcement actions, a key feature of actions alleging that 
individuals misappropriated information from a source. Part 
VII explores the targets of civil and criminal insider trading 
enforcement. Brief concluding remarks follow. A data appendix 
provides additional description of the variables studied. 
II.  The Rhetoric and Critique of Insider Trading Enforcement 
A.  Insider Trading Rhetoric 
Insider trading has a set of stock narratives and metaphors 
that shape the way the public, lawyers, and judges talk and 
write about it.58 The laws prohibiting it have an enormous 
symbolic resonance and the law’s narrative conventions tend to 
flow from and reinforce that message. As Donald Langevoort 
has argued, insider trading law expresses a deep social 
commitment to equal opportunity along with a desire for strict 
adherence to fiduciary obligations.59 Insider trading embodies a 
 
 57. See infra Table 10. 
 58. See Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg, Introduction to NARRATIVE 
AND METAPHOR IN THE LAW 1, 1–10 (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds., 
2018) (examining the function of narrative and metaphor in legal theory and 
practice). 
 59. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology 
and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1327–31 
(1999). 
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revulsion for elite special privileges.60 Concerns about it 
similarly reflect our perennially ambivalent attitudes regarding 
the morality and mores of SMPs.61  
When insider trading pervades the common consciousness, 
it tends to follow a narrow set of story lines. For the better part 
of two centuries Wall Street has been a recurring villain in 
American life,62 and it is unsurprising to find the stock market 
operator at the center of many insider trading morality plays. 
Ivan Boesky,63 Raj Rajaratnam,64 Steven Cohen,65 and Gordon 
Gekko66—real and fictional insider traders—exploit their 
market savvy and superior access to MNPI to earn undeserved 
wealth at the expense of ordinary investors. Their profits come 
not from productive hard work, but from jumping the line ahead 
of less sophisticated or less connected investors. 
Corporate executives,67 directors,68 and even members of 
Congress69 act wrongfully when they breach a fiduciary or other 
well-recognized duty of trust and confidence to misappropriate 
information for personal gain or to pass it on to friends and 
 
 60. See id. at 1328–29. 
 61. See Michael A. Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading, 2019 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 951, 967–71 (2019) (historical analysis of legal treatment of and 
attitudes regarding insider trading). 
 62. See STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR 412 (2005) (“There were 
plenty of enemies out there, many candidates vying for the role of ‘the big bad 
wolf.’ But the biggest and baddest wolf everyone, or nearly everyone, would 
have settled on was Wall Street.”). 
 63. See STEWART, supra note 37, at 81–206. 
 64. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 65. See Cohen, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 4307, 2016 
SEC LEXIS 3256 (Jan. 8, 2016). 
 66. See WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1259 (10th Cir. 
2009) (affirming the insider trading conviction of Joseph Nacchio, former CEO 
of Qwest Communications International, Inc.). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(upholding the securities fraud convictions of Rajat Gupta, a director of 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.). 
 69. See Michael A. Perino, A Scandalous Perversion of Trust: Modern 
Lessons from the Early History of Congressional Insider Trading, 67 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 335, 391–92 (2014) (examining congressional insider trading and 
questioning the necessity of its legislative prohibition). 
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family. Neither courts70 nor the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines71 
look favorably on such defendants. But really any famous 
defendant works to tell a story about unfair advantages 
inappropriately conferred on the favored few.72 That (along with 
a healthy dose of schadenfreude) is why insider trading scandals 
involving public figures (Martha Stewart, for example) garner 
outsized attention as compared to their size and significance.73 
In a more cynical version of this narrative, insider trading 
became a crime because those without wealth or privileged 
access to information envied those who did.74 Congress and 
enforcement officials capitalized on those sentiments to help 
legitimize their own positions.75 As Thomas Joo has argued, 
condemning insider trading allowed government officials to 
translate “economic issues into a moral conflict in which the 
government clearly held the high ground.”76 Insider trading 
prosecutions could distract from more complicated, intractable 
problems in capital markets.77 During economic crises, insider 
trading focused attention on an easily understood and 
seemingly unfair practice and away from the more complex, 
difficult roots of those upheavals—systemic problems that legal 
standards and enforcement officials may have been ill-equipped 
to address.78 Clearly, enforcers act illegitimately if they put 
these kinds of political needs ahead of public interest. As 
 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (asserting that the defendant “brazenly” breached his fiduciary duty). 
 71. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018) (imposing an additional penalty when a defendant abuses a position of 
trust); see also id. § 2B1.4 (addressing insider trading). 
 72. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 73. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Martha Stewart Settles Civil 
Insider-Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/KCG9-MBBV (reporting Martha Stewart’s settlement 
agreement regarding her insider trading charges). 
 74. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of 
Martha Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2026 n.13 (2005). 
 75. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and 
Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 575 (2007). 
 76. Id. at 602. 
 77. See id. at 576. 
 78. See id. 
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Margaret Lemos has written, we should “disapprove of 
enforcement decisions that echo the angry mob.”79  
The rhetoric justifying enforcement efforts leans heavily on 
gambling and sports metaphors and reinforces the dominant 
narrative. Courts have branded convicted insider traders as 
“cheats” who take unfair advantage of ordinary investors.80 The 
most common justification for prohibiting insider trading is that 
it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the stock 
market.81 Without that confidence, ordinary investors would 
refuse to invest, ultimately impairing capital formation.82 Or, as 
the Supreme Court observed: “Who would knowingly roll the 
dice in a crooked crap game?”83 
SEC officials thus portray themselves as vigorous 
guardians of market fairness.84 Insider trading enforcement has 
been a central focus of the SEC’s efforts since at least 1981, 
when Chairman John Shad announced that the agency would 
“comedown on insider trading with hobnail boots.”85 A decade 
later, another chairman vowed to leave a defendant, “naked, 
homeless, and without wheels.”86 In the ensuing years, other 
SEC officials, albeit in less colorful language, have consistently 
asserted that policing insider trading “bolster[s] the confidence 
so necessary for our markets to thrive.”87   
 
 79. Lemos, supra note 25, at 964. 
 80. See SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 81. See Perino, supra note 61, at 952 n.1. 
 82. See id. at 957. 
 83. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (determining that an act is necessary “to insure 
the maintenance of fair and honest markets”). 
 85. Leslie Wayne, Inside Trading by Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1984 
(§ 3), at 1.  
 86. Jonathan Meyer Eisenberg, Enforcement Issues and Litigation, 21 
SEC. REGUL. L.J. 421, 421–22 (1994) (quoting Kevin G. Salwen & Laurie P. 
Cohen, SEC Under Breeden Takes a Harder Line on Securities Crime, WALL 
ST. J., May 10, 1990, at A1). 
 87. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at 
the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks (Feb. 24, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/JB8T-4SQ3 (PDF).  
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SEC rhetoric also tends to focus on the resources deployed 
to detect even small and obscure violations.88 After the financial 
crisis, the SEC invested in information technology designed to 
root out cases that may have previously gone undetected.89 It 
was part of a larger “broken windows” enforcement approach 
that sought to bring “cases against traders of all different types” 
and to pursue “every level of violation.”90  
Nowhere was the rhetoric about fairness, status, and 
privilege more prominent than in the public statements of the 
prosecutors who spearheaded the post-financial crisis 
crackdown on insider trading.91 Enforcing those proscriptions, 
former U.S. Attorney Bharara observed, was a commitment that 
“our markets should be fair; that our playing fields should be 
level; and that our citizens’ accounts should be secure.”92 
Prosecutorial efforts sought to protect a “free and fair 
marketplace” where ordinary investors did not have to fear that 
privileged insiders were rigging the market.93 For Bharara, 
 
 88. See Oversight of the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2015 Budget 
Request Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 57 (2014) (statement 
of Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://perma.cc/K4EQ-
8JSL (PDF) (“[W]e have continued to improve our efficiency and effectiveness 
by . . . deploying more risk-based analytics to allow us to do more with our 
resources, and to do so more quickly.”). 
 89. See MARY L. SCHAPIRO, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2010), https://perma.cc/8E2G-YWWG 
(PDF). 
 90. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before 
the SEC Historical Society (June 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/S23B-CDMK 
(PDF); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/S8FQ-TWNV 
(PDF). 
 91. See Bharara, supra note 14. 
 92. Id.  
 93. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Managing Director of 
Investment Bank Found Guilty of Insider Trading Charges (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/LF67-UKJ5 (PDF) (“Insider trading rigs the securities 
markets in favor of cheaters, and we will continue to investigate and prosecute 
this crime aggressively.”); Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street 
Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012, at 23, https://perma.cc/BX8G-XYUY (PDF) 
‘Insider trading tells everybody at precisely the wrong time that 
everything is rigged,’ [Bharara] says, ‘and only people who have a 
billion dollars and have access to and are best friends with people 
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insider trading was most pernicious and harmful when it was 
committed by the wealthy or by SMPs.94 “Disturbingly,” he 
noted, “many of the people who are going to such lengths to 
obtain inside information for a trading advantage are already 
among the most advantaged, privileged, and wealthy insiders in 
modern finance,”95 and he decried a “creeping culture of 
corruption”96 on Wall Street.  
Enforcement rhetoric thus focuses on issues of market 
integrity and fairness. It emphasizes the role that civil and 
criminal actions play in maintaining a level playing field. And 
it targets its sharpest criticism for SMPs and the upper echelons 
of corporate America, along with the wealthy and 
well-connected. Legal scholars tend to see matters from a 
substantially different perspective. 
B.  The Academic Critique of Insider Trading 
A consistent complaint in insider trading scholarship is that 
insider trading is not precisely defined in any federal statute.97 
The proscription has instead emerged from what Jill Fisch calls 
a “lawmaking partnership” between Congress, the SEC, federal 
prosecutors, and the courts.98 
 
who are on boards of directors of major companies—they’re the only 
ones who can make a true buck.’ 
 94. See Preet Bharara, Why Corporate Fraud Is so Rampant: Wall Street’s 
Cop, CNBC (July 23, 2012, 1:33 PM), https://perma.cc/43UC-FABB (“We have 
witnessed the most educated, successful, and monied professionals in the 
country put their companies—not to mention their own liberty—at risk by 
engaging in flagrant and foolhardy illegal conduct.”).  
 95. Bharara, supra note 14. 
 96. Calabresi & Saporito, supra note 93, at 23.  
 97. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Tippees and Tippers: The Impact of Martoma 
II, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 23, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/T4JQ-NQL6 (“Congress should take up the difficult and 
dangerous task of turning a common law crime into a real statute.”). Recently, 
Bharara agreed to lead a task force that would propose changes to update 
insider trading law. See Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Opinion, 
Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up with the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2018), https://perma.cc/5AQF-UPMD. 
 98. Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking 
Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 480–81 (2015). 
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The most frequently used statute does not mention insider 
trading. Section 10(b) empowers the SEC to promulgate rules 
prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance . . . .”99 Using that power, the SEC adopted Rule 
10b-5, which prohibits material misrepresentations or 
omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.100  Nineteen years after adopting Rule 10b-5, the SEC 
decided in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.101 that a broker violated it 
when he traded after being tipped by a director that a company 
was about to cut its dividend.102  
Corporate law scholar William Cary, at the time the SEC 
Chairman and the author of that opinion, articulated the same 
fairness concerns that would animate enforcement over the 
ensuing decades.103 Prohibiting insider trading responded to 
“the plight of the buying public—wholly unprotected from the 
misuse of special information.”104 To promote investor 
confidence, the prohibition should be broadly stated and applied 
expansively, not hemmed in by the “fine distinctions and rigid 
classifications” that had limited insider trading under state 
common law.105  
For a time, courts adopted that view, holding that the SEC’s 
“abstain or disclose” rule applied to “anyone” in possession of 
MNPI.106 But in a now familiar history, three Supreme Court 
cases—Chiarella v. United States,107 Dirks v. SEC,108 and 
 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020). 
 101. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 SEC 
LEXIS 385 (Nov. 8, 1961).  
 102. Id. at *4. 
 103. See id. at *12 (stating that the obligation for corporate insiders goes 
to “the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing”). 
 104. Id. at *15. 
 105. Id. at *12; see Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the 
Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 430–31 
(2013) (discussing Cady, Roberts). 
 106. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 107. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 108. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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United States v. O’Hagan109—substantially reshaped insider 
trading liability. Chiarella held that silence is only a fraud if the 
trader owes a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence to 
the person on the other side of the transaction (the “classic” 
theory of insider trading).110 Dirks sought to limit the liability of 
tippers and tippees.111 Tippees are only liable if the original tip 
was passed in breach of a fiduciary duty and if the tippees know 
about the breach and that the tip involved MNPI.112 Worried 
about the inhibiting influence that an imprecise standard might 
have on securities analysts, Dirks held that such breaches occur 
only when the tipper receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit for making the tip, which can be a pecuniary gain, a 
reputational benefit, or when he or she makes a gift of the 
information to a relative or friend.113 In O’Hagan, the Court 
expanded liability by endorsing the misappropriation theory, 
which makes liable those who take information in breach of a 
fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence owed to the 
source of the information.114 
Thus, for nearly sixty years, the precise contours of insider 
trading liability have flowed from case law rather than precise 
statutory language. Some view this lawmaking partnership as 
a virtue rather than a handicap. Donna Nagy argues that 
Congress’s legislative efforts have ratified and built on the 
Court’s insider trading jurisprudence.115 “Congress’s multiple 
determinations to forego a legislative definition,” she wrote, 
“evidence not abdication, but rather concerted judgments that 
fraud-based insider trading and tipping proscriptions—and the 
interstitial lawmaking inherent in such proscriptions—put 
securities traders on appropriate notice that transactions based 
on misappropriated information will be subject to stiff civil 
 
 109. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 110. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33. 
 111. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660, 663–64. 
 112. Id. at 660. 
 113. See id. at 663–64.  
 114. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650–52. 
 115. Donna Nagy, Salman v. United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping 
Point?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 32 (2016). 
        
REAL INSIDER TRADING  1665 
 
sanctions and harsh criminal penalties.”116 For Jill Fisch, this 
lawmaking partnership provides more than political insulation 
for Congress.117 An iterative and responsive lawmaking 
partnership “is well positioned to respond to the dynamic 
structure of the securities markets and the evolution of 
information flow due to changes in technology and market 
participants.”118 
But flexibility can go hand-in-hand with a lack of clarity, 
and many commentators question whether market participants 
have appropriate notice about what conduct is subject to 
enforcement.119 To be sure, there is a broad general consensus 
about the “heartland” of insider trading.120 Many cases fit 
comfortably within existing doctrines.121 It is at the boundaries 
where problems arise. In these areas, scholars have highlighted 
a host of anomalies and inconsistencies that could lead to 
inconsistent and overbroad enforcement. And uncertainty 
abounds over whether these marginal cases represent the bulk, 
or even a substantial minority, of enforcement output. 
A common critique involves the definition of materiality, an 
area where the SEC and courts have never been willing to create 
bright-line rules.122 Some commentators worry that enforcers 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 470–71; Langevoort, supra note 59, at 
1340 (“[Leaving] hard issues open to ad hoc judicial resolution is a good way 
to avoid (or at least defer) costly political confrontation.”).  
 118. Fisch, supra note 98, at 484; see Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of 
Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1563–64 (2008) (arguing that broad 
statutes can be used to respond to criminal innovation). 
 119. See Buell, supra note 118, at 1547 (arguing that broad standards can 
result in a lack of clarity for market participants). 
 120. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading 
after United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 228 (1999) (arguing that 
the evolution of insider trading law has nothing to do with the heart of it). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Tinghui Xie, 942 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 122. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 1338 (describing Congress’s 
decision to forego a definition of “materiality” even after it was recommended 
by the American Law Institute). 
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could exploit imprecise materiality standards to bolster their 
enforcement statistics.123 
To the extent that there are uncertainties in insider trading 
doctrine and enforcers exercise insufficient prosecutorial 
discretion, the resulting difficulties will be most acute in 
criminal cases. Many commentators and scholars argue that 
insider trading cases represent a classic case of prosecutorial 
overreach, a misuse of criminal processes to penalize what are 
at most fiduciary breaches.124 Rather than acting through the 
usual rulemaking checks and balances or through the politically 
accountable legislative process, enforcers pursue “regulation by 
enforcement,”125 and define insider trading doctrine 
haphazardly or in ways that maximize the interests of enforcers. 
Commentators worry—particularly in times of economic 
turmoil—that vague criminal liability standards will 
“embolden[] prosecutors to push the law beyond established 
boundaries.”126 And they suggest that novel theories the SEC 
pursues in civil cases will bleed over into criminal 
prosecutions.127 
These due process concerns have centered recently on 
liability standards for remote tippees, individuals who receive a 
 
 123. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 955 (“Enforcers likewise may be anxious 
to please their overseers with impressive statistics of cases won and 
settlements secured.”). 
 124. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 703, 713–14 (2005) (“[I]t encompasses a broad array of issues, including: 
what should be denominated as a crime and when it should be enforced; who 
falls within the law’s strictures or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; and 
what should be the boundary.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean 
“Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in 
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 202 (1991) (“[F]ew legal categories seem 
inherently less ‘criminal’ in character than the civil law applicable to fiduciary 
duties or to the use of economic duress in negotiations.”). 
 125. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 949–50. For analyses focusing 
specifically on the SEC, see ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 102 
(1982); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by 
Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 156–57 
(1990). 
 126. J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States 
v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (2015). 
 127. See Pritchard, supra note 32, at 62. 
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tip not directly from an insider but from another tippee.128 Other 
scholars worry that the SEC pursues an ever-expansive 
definition of duties under the misappropriation theory.129 
Rather than focusing on employment relationships or other 
traditional fiduciary duties, critics point to cases where the SEC 
has found duties of trust and confidence in family relationships, 
friendships, and in other unusual relationships—unusual, that 
is, in terms of established common law duties.130 The farther 
afield enforcers search for remote tippees, the more expansively 
they define duties, and the less notice individuals will 
presumably have that their conduct violated Rule 10b-5. 
This lack of notice about the scope of liability is a perennial 
issue.131 Justice Scalia argued in Whitman v. United States,132 
that the Court was not required to defer to either a prosecutor’s 
or the SEC’s interpretation of the scope of insider trading 
liability.133 He signaled a willingness to carve back on the 
breadth of insider trading doctrine through the rule of lenity.134 
While the Court recently upheld a reasonably broad 
interpretation of tipper liability,135 questions remain about the 
 
 128. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 483. 
 129. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary 
Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1189, 1243–45 (1995). 
 130. See Painter, supra note 120, at 176–77. 
 131. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) (“[A] 
judicial holding that certain undefined activities ‘generally are prohibited’ by 
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States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (claiming that this 
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the prohibition as well as its scope.”); Painter, supra note 120, at 210 
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 132. 574 U.S. 1003 (2014).  
 133. Id. at 1003, 1005. 
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 135. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016). 
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overlap between criminal and civil enforcement.136 Indeed, 
recent enforcement efforts have sought to avoid some of the 
definitional landmines that have arisen under Rule 10b-5 by 
pursuing insider trading prosecution under a broad, but 
infrequently used, securities fraud provision in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.137 
III.  Incentives and Enforcement Choices 
Enforcement is policymaking.138 Whether in the civil or 
criminal context, enforcers shape the law when they make 
choices about which cases to pursue and which to drop.139 They 
regularly make decisions about enforcement strategy, choosing 
to emphasize particular kinds of violations or focusing efforts on 
particular industries.140 Those priorities shift not only from 
administration to administration141 but from one enforcement 
official to the next.142 Enforcers exercise largely unreviewable 
discretion in deciding what and how to charge.143 In a world 
where most cases settle, they act as both enforcer and 
 
 136. See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 
2142–43 (2015) (describing overlapping enforcement authority, which could 
include those in the Department of Justice with those in other executive 
agencies). 
 137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266; see United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 
30–34 (2d Cir. 2019) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1348); Karen E. Woody, 
The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 614–17 (2020) (discussing 
increasing use of § 1348). 
 138. See Lemos, supra note 25, at 947–49. 
 139. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 41 (2017) (“[T]he most 
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 140. Id.  
 141. Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential 
Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 198 (1982). 
 142. See Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the 
Law: A Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1534 (2018) 
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 143. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
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adjudicator,144 deciding what punishments are warranted by 
what conduct, only sporadically subject to meaningful judicial 
oversight.145 Insider trading enforcement is no exception. 
Indeed, given the vague statutory language, questions 
regarding how law on the books translates into law in action 
assume even greater importance. Evidence of regular 
enforcement overreach would be cause for significant concern. 
But claims about overly broad interpretation of vague 
insider trading proscriptions do not match up well with broader 
academic critiques of securities enforcement, which tend to 
paint a picture of timid government authorities looking to 
inflate their enforcement statistics.146 Rather than pursuing 
complicated and uncertain cases, critics argue the SEC has 
strong institutional incentives to pursue low-level targets 
engaged in obvious wrongdoing.147 In these accounts, 
enforcement discretion is largely a principal-agent problem, 
with the agent (the SEC) maximizing its own interests over 
those of the principal (the general public).148 If the principal 
cannot perfectly monitor the agent, the agent has an incentive 
to choose sub-optimal enforcement strategies that create the 
appearance of competent and vigorous performance.149 Agencies 
may, for example, select a portfolio of cases that yields the 
 
 144. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 
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 145. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 
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enforcement, the upshot is that agencies seeking to build reputations as 
effective enforcers will tend to emphasize easily measurable accomplishments 
rather than more amorphous forms of success.”).  
 147. See Macey, supra note 33, at 646 (“Because investigations take time, 
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 148. See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 194–202 (2014). 
 149. See id. at 195. 
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highest win rate and the most actions filed, even if deterrence 
might be better served by choosing a different mix of cases.150  
It is not hard to see evidence of principal-agent problems in 
the SEC’s enforcement program. Whenever questions arise 
about the Commission’s legitimacy or competence, SEC officials 
reliably tout the number of enforcement actions they bring and 
the aggregate amount of fines and penalties they collect.151 Of 
course, those metrics do not reveal much about the quality of 
the SEC’s enforcement program, but when those totals exceed 
the year before, Congress seems more inclined to accede to its 
budget requests.152 As Johnathan Macey has noted, this creates 
an incentive at the Commission to pursue cases that are likely 
to settle quickly.153 The staff even has a name for those 
actions— “stats point” cases.154 Viewed in this light, the recent 
broken windows rhetoric might be little more than an attempt 
to justify an enforcement program designed to inflate statistics 
and to create a veneer of vigorous enforcement. Although the 
SEC claims to devote considerable time and effort to 
investigating insider trading claims,155 the current structure of 
congressional oversight should incentivize it to target cases 
where the necessary investigation is minimal because much of 
the legwork has already been undertaken or because liability is 
so obvious.156  
But the preference for quick settlements might be as much 
about resource constraints as it is about disguising 
underperformance. The SEC’s resource constraints have been 
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well documented,157 and are particularly acute with respect to 
the agency’s capacity to try cases.158 Trial attorneys make up 
only 10 percent of the non-supervisory enforcement staff.159 The 
SEC has traditionally done a poor job of coordinating the work 
of its investigative and trial attorneys, with some reports 
suggesting an often dysfunctional relationship between the 
groups.160 An enforcement agency operating under these 
limitations could easily choose to concentrate on matters that 
are likely to settle.161 
Individual SEC enforcement attorneys and prosecutors are 
subject to their own agency costs, and these incentives have 
likewise figured prominently in the academic literature. The 
most simplistic explanation is the familiar “revolving door” 
argument, in which SEC officials take a light touch with 
regulated entities in order to increase their chances for lucrative 
post-government employment.162 The crude version of that 
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hypothesis is almost surely inaccurate because prosecutors and 
SEC enforcement officials often make their names by taking on 
and winning high-profile cases.163 Rather than rent-seeking, 
many attorneys choose government employment to develop 
saleable skills and a reputation for legal ability, judgment, and 
success that will make them valuable in the private sector.164  
While high-profile cases entail substantial potential 
rewards, they also present substantial risks to this human 
capital investment. As Samuel Buell notes, “no rational, 
ambitious lawyer . . . wants to be known as the Captain Ahab of 
prosecutors, the one who foolishly went after the biggest quarry 
but failed to land it.”165 The higher the defendant’s profile, the 
more resources he or she brings to the defense, the greater risk 
of loss the case entails. High-profile defendants in insider 
trading cases often have the financial resources to litigate 
aggressively and at length and to retain the most skilled defense 
counsel available.166 They often leverage their personal 
 
evidence of a capture effect or finds evidence of an opposite effect that the 
revolving door indeed results in more aggressive, not less aggressive, 
regulatory actions”). 
 163. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional 
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 812 (1998) 
(noting that lawyers in U.S. Attorney’s Offices often try to advance their 
careers through “conspicuous litigation victories against well-represented 
targets”); Rakoff, supra note 157 (“[W]hatever small influence the ‘revolving 
door’ may have in discouraging certain white-collar prosecutions is more than 
offset, at least in the case of prosecuting high-level individuals, by the 
career-making benefits such prosecutions confer on the successful 
prosecutor.”). 
 164. See Ed deHaan et al., The Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement 
Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 65, 
66– 68 (2015) (asserting that attorneys who left the SEC to join firms 
specializing in defending SEC enforcement actions were associated with more 
aggressive enforcement actions at the SEC); Richard T. Boylan, What Do 
Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 379, 396 (2005) (stating that successful U.S. attorneys are more 
likely to become federal judges or partners in a large private practice later in 
their careers). 
 165. SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 189 (2016). 
 166. See Walter Pavlo, The High Cost of Mounting a White-Collar 
Criminal Defense, FORBES (May 30, 2013, 7:39 AM), https://perma.cc/K96S-
P44Z. 
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resources through director and officer liability policies or 
indemnification provisions, which typically require insurers or 
the company to advance defense costs.167 These defendants are 
likely to attract substantial media attention, magnifying the 
potential reputational gains or losses.168 By capitalizing on 
these factors, defense attorneys can act as a significant check on 
overly aggressive enforcement efforts. 
These advantages accrue before, during, and after trial. 
Defense lawyers can control and monitor information flows to 
prosecutors during the investigative phase of a case.169 Through 
“conference room litigation”170 they can meet with prosecutors 
or use Wells submissions to persuade enforcers that the legal 
theories or evidence are too weak to support a claim or that they 
support only a civil one.171 Defendants will have both the 
incentives and the resources to pursue every avenue of appeal 
should they lose at trial. 
These factors suggest a strong selection effect in 
enforcement decisions and a potential inverse relationship 
between the high-profile nature of the case or the defendant and 
 
 167. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION 42–76 (2010); see also XL Specialty Ins. v. Level Global Invs., L.P., 
874 F. Supp. 2d 263, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that once an insurer’s 
duty to pay arises, “under a directors and officers liability policy calling for the 
reimbursement of defense expenses . . . ‘insurers are required to make 
contemporaneous interim advances of defense expenses’” (quoting Fed. Ins. v. 
Kozlowski, 792 N.Y.S.2d 397, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005))). 
 168. See Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, When Talk is Not 
Cheap: Communications with the Media, the Government and Other Parties in 
High Profile White Collar Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2002) 
(“By definition, media will be involved to some extent in any high-profile 
case.”).  
 169. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 1613, 1631 (2007).  
 170. Buell, supra note 36, at 885. 
 171. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: 
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 99 (1991) (“Early legal 
strategies may include negotiations with the agencies involved, the seeking of 
civil or out-of-court resolution of the case, and the trading of information in 
return for favorable treatment from the prosecutor’s office.”); Gerard E. Lynch, 
Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 
2125–29 (1998) (explaining how skilled defense attorneys can influence a 
prosecutor’s legal conclusions through “the power of persuasion”). 
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the strength of the evidence or novelty of the legal theories. All 
things being equal, rational enforcement attorneys should view 
cases against high-profile, well-resourced targets as high 
risk-reward investments. On average, it should only be rational 
for risk-averse attorneys to pursue them when the evidence of 
liability or guilt is overwhelming and when the legal standards 
are certain.  
An example is the recent prosecution of Rajat Gupta.172 
Gupta, a member of the Goldman Sachs board, learned that 
Warren Buffet was about to make a substantial investment in 
the company.173 Coming in the middle of the financial crisis, 
there was a high probability that the vote of confidence from 
Buffett would lift the company’s stock price.174 A minute after 
the board meeting ended, Gupta telephoned his friend, hedge 
fund founder Raj Rajaratnam, who purchased several hundred 
thousand shares of Goldman stock.175 The FBI had previously 
wiretapped Rajaratnam’s phone, and the next day he was heard 
bragging that he had received a call “saying something good’s 
gonna happen” at Goldman.176 After he was indicted, Gupta 
mounted a vigorous defense, spending by some accounts nearly 
$30 million, most of it funded by Goldman.177 He was convicted 
and has lost multiple appeals.178 But given the clear evidence 
and absence of novel legal issues, the case represented precisely 
the kind of high-profile matter enforcers should be willing to 
undertake. 
Prominent past failures are likely to weigh heavily on the 
minds of enforcement officials choosing whether to pursue 
high-profile targets.179 In the language of behavioral economics, 
they will be very available and thus over-weighted in calculating 
 
 172. See United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 173. See id. at 117. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 128. 
 177. See Peter Lattman, Goldman Stuck with a Defense Tab, and Awaiting 
a Payback, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2012, 8:35 PM), https://perma.cc/4VSW-
TA4V.  
 178. See Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 179. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990). 
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probabilities.180 The counterexample to Gupta is the SEC’s 
failed enforcement action against Mark Cuban.181 The SEC 
alleged that Cuban, a minority stockholder in an internet 
start-up, learned from the company’s CEO about an impending 
PIPE transaction, which would cause the company’s stock price 
to decline.182 Cuban allegedly acknowledged that he could not 
sell his stock before the deal was announced but did so 
anyway.183  
Unlike the case against Gupta, where it was clear that a 
director owed a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of 
MNPI, it was far from certain that a simple breach of a 
confidentiality agreement was enough for liability.184 Nor was it 
even certain that such an agreement existed.185 After a four-year 
investigation, the SEC nonetheless filed an enforcement action 
and spent the next five years litigating it.186 Cuban mounted a 
vigorous defense, hiring a leading securities attorney and 
reportedly spending more in legal fees than the estimated 
potential fines he would have incurred had he settled.187 The 
district court originally dismissed the complaint, only to have 
the Fifth Circuit reverse.188 A jury ultimately found Cuban not 
liable.189 That outcome was widely reported in the media, as 
were Cuban’s claims that the SEC tried to “bully” him into 
settlement.190 Cuban’s complaints led to an internal 
 
 180. See id.  
 181. See generally SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 182. Id. at 552. 
 183. Id.  
 184. See Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 
36 J. CORP. L. 343, 363 (2011). 
 185. See Cuban, 620 F.3d at 552. 
 186. See Jana J. Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider 
Trading; Blasts U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:44 PM), 
https://perma.cc/5L97-EVKA (PDF).  
 187. See id.  
 188. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558. 
 189. Pruet, supra note 186. 
 190. See id. 
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investigation of the attorneys.191 High-profile failures like this 
one can reasonably be expected to cause enforcers to take a 
cautious approach to prominent targets, especially in cases 
where the evidence is not overwhelming or where the legal 
theory is untested.  
Indeed, a 2013 Government Accountability Office study 
reported precisely this kind of risk-averse environment at the 
SEC.192 Contrary to Jill Fisch’s view about the benefits of the 
law-making partnership in insider trading, cautious agency 
personnel often chose not to pursue “cases that address evolving 
market practices or developments with little precedent . . . .”193 
Layers of review slowed cases and “created an atmosphere of 
fear and insecurity, and may have created incentives for staff to 
drop cases or narrow the scope of review.”194 A majority of 
surveyed SEC employees agreed that a “fear of public scandals 
has made the SEC overly cautious and risk averse.”195 A 2010 
report by the SEC Office of Inspector General came to similar 
conclusions, finding that the “arduous process of getting the 
SEC staff’s approval in Washington, DC to recommend an 
Enforcement action” led staff to “focus on easier cases, the ‘quick 
hits.’”196  
These dynamics create a quite different risk-return 
calculation for lower profile targets. With fewer resources to 
litigate and perhaps lower stakes, these defendants will face 
greater pressure to settle.197 Indeed, these defendants are in a 
position far closer to that facing the typical street criminal than 
 
 191. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., ALLEGATIONS OF 
ENFORCEMENT STAFF MISCONDUCT IN INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATION 82–89 
(2011) https://perma.cc/CR8A-THW3 (PDF). 
 192. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 160, at 15 (“[S]enior 
officers and staff surveyed remarked that recent enforcement failures and 
related, sustained criticism . . . has contributed to their unwillingness to take 
risk and innovate.”).  
 193. Id. at 17.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 16 tbl.5. 
 196. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF 
THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S 
ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 124, 129 (2010), https://perma.cc/7UHX-AF2J (PDF). 
 197. See Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure 
on White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 860 (2009). 
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the well-resourced white collar one. Aggressive enforcement 
tactics are less risky in these cases because they are unlikely to 
garner significant media attention. Under these circumstances, 
enforcers might be willing to pursue more novel interpretations 
of legal standards, which may rarely be tested in court if these 
cases settle disproportionately. Although civil settlements or 
plea agreements have no precedential value, critics worry that 
settlements involving novel legal theories will nonetheless shift 
liability standards.198 The net effect will be an incremental 
broadening of insider trading doctrine. 
This risk-reward relationship is reinforced by the biases 
and heuristics of individual enforcement attorneys. Myopic loss 
aversion and narrow framing can lead individuals acting within 
organizations to be overly cautious in the initiatives they 
undertake.199 The SEC opens around one thousand 
investigations a year, each of which is best viewed as a risky 
capital investment project.200 On an agency wide scale, the SEC 
should have strong incentives to include some risky, high-profile 
cases in its portfolio. Not all of them will succeed, but those that 
do can be expected to have a strong deterrent effect.201 Even if 
the probability of getting caught for insider trading is low, 
high-profile prosecutions will be very available to market 
participants. The ease of recalling these cases may lead them to 
overestimate probabilities of a successful enforcement action, 
enhancing the SEC’s deterrence goals. Leveraging the 
availability heuristic not only provides a rationale for bringing 
high-profile cases likely to draw media attention, it also justifies 
crackdowns, which have a similar effect.202 These factors help 
 
 198. See Matthew C. Turk, Regulation by Settlement, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 
259, 260–61 (2017). 
 199. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold 
Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 18–24 
(1993). 
 200. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT: 2019 
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2019), https://perma.cc/Y937-8X8L (PDF). 
 201. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538 (1998) (explaining how making law 
enforcement highly visible can deter crime because “individuals tend to judge 
the likelihood of certain events (such as getting caught for a crime) by how 
available such instances are to the human mind”).  
 202. See Sohoni, supra note 139, at 33. 
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explain the SEC’s penchant for insider trading cases involving 
public figures or unusual or entertaining facts, which are likely 
to appeal to reporters.  
Individual enforcement attorneys likely have a different 
calculus. If on average enforcement attorneys weigh potential 
losses more heavily than potential gains, they will have strong 
incentives to take on only cases that they believe have a strong 
likelihood of winning.203  Defense attorneys can exploit this 
natural loss aversion by focusing on the potential weaknesses in 
the government’s case. For example, government attorneys 
apparently re-evaluated their decision to bring charges against 
Steven Cohen after defense counsel’s exhaustive analysis of the 
weaknesses in the government’s evidence.204  
Enforcers may anticipate these problems before they arise, 
leading to wholesale shifts in which cases they choose to 
investigate. Government attorneys unwilling to take too many 
risks (or speculating that the risks of pursuing large, 
high-profile cases will be insuperable) may not even try, shifting 
their efforts to investigating and settling many small cases. 
Shirking agents may pursue easy cases or those in which much 
of the investigative work has already occurred. This is likely a 
bigger problem for career enforcers, but even those looking to 
return to the private sector might be drawn to these matters. 
Small cases may not have as much potential to enhance their 
reputations but investigating and settling them could still 
signal to future employers that the attorney possesses 
substantial skills, all without the risk of a high-profile failure.  
The pressure to choose the least risky option does not 
diminish (and may in fact intensify) where probabilities of 
success are difficult to assess ex ante and where supervisors will 
review the individual’s decisions frequently under less than 
certain metrics.205 If the results of investigations were 
aggregated and attorneys’ overall success rate was the only 
measure of performance, attorneys might be willing to take 
 
 203. See Kahneman et al., supra note 179, at 1326. 
 204. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 37, at 239–44 (detailing Cohen’s 
attorneys’ strategy to focus “on the government’s weak spot: its crippling fear 
of losing a big case”). 
 205. See Richard H. Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion 
of Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 112 Q. J. ECON. 647, 648 (1997). 
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greater risks. But it will be difficult for the Commission to send 
credible signals to its employees that investigations that do not 
lead to an enforcement action or that lead to a Commission loss 
will not count against them.206 Indeed, since supervisors will 
view staff attorneys’ decisions in hindsight, there is a 
substantial risk that they will attribute those outcomes to either 
poor decision-making or poor lawyering. The risk of hindsight 
bias will push attorneys toward cases that seem obvious at the 
outset. This will especially be so when the attorney who took the 
risky case is viewed in the context of her more conservative 
colleagues. In a world where the convention is to make the safe 
choice, blame for excessive risk taking is more likely for the 
individual bucking that norm.207 
Are government officials timid enforcers who are only 
willing to pursue clear-cut and obvious cases of insider trading 
or aggressive ones who regularly stretch the bounds of legal 
doctrine to bring unwarranted claims? Who are the targets of 
those cases? Are they the market elites of popular rhetoric or 
are do they tend to be less well-resourced and lower profile 
traders? Do market participants have sufficient notice of the 
kinds of behavior that lead to civil or criminal charges? 
Answering these questions without hard empirical data is 
difficult because enforcers are subject to a wide variety of 
incentives, which in many cases work at cross purposes. 
Focusing on just one incentive in isolation (for example, the 
desire for individual enforcers to build human capital) might 
lead to a prediction that attorneys will aggressively pursue 
high-profile insider trading cases with novel legal theories. 
Picking others (such as institutional incentives to maximize 
enforcement statistics and individual loss aversion) might lead 
to the opposite prediction.  
In the current, largely anecdotal debate, it has been easy to 
cherry pick individual cases of prosecutorial overreach, cases of 
 
 206. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 160, at 36 
(explaining that during the time period under study, SEC employees had low 
morale, a high distrust of management, and expressed concerns about the 
uncertain link between their actual and rated performance). 
 207. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 347 (2011) 
(demonstrating that judgmental observers tend to assign more blame to the 
habitual risktaker than non-risktakers). 
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obvious but comparatively minor wrongdoing that settle 
quickly, or cases that articulated an aggressive vision of some 
element of an insider trading claim. But to properly evaluate 
how enforcement actually operates requires a more systematic 
analysis of which cases prosecutors and the SEC actually bring 
and how those cases are resolved.  
IV.  The Dataset 
To analyze real insider trading, I compiled a hand-collected 
sample of insider trading cases filed in SEC fiscal years 2011 to 
2015 (October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2015). Cases were 
identified using the SEC’s Select SEC and Market Data report, 
which lists enforcement actions organized by type.208 As Urska 
Velikonja’s research has demonstrated, however, these reports 
are highly unreliable for identifying the true level of SEC 
enforcement activity because the SEC is inconsistent in how it 
structures its actions.209 In some cases, it names all individuals 
in a single civil complaint or administrative proceeding; in 
others, it files separate actions against each defendant.210 
Inconsistencies abound in how the SEC classifies its cases.211  
To avoid these inconsistencies the unit of analysis in this 
study is the individual defendant.212 For each defendant 
identified in an SEC enforcement action, I collected data to 
determine whether that same defendant was the subject of a 
parallel criminal action.213 Any additional defendants named in 
criminal actions that were not previously identified in SEC 
actions were added to the database. For a case to be included, 
there had to be an insider trading claim. Thus, an 
 
 208. See Reports and Publications, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://perma.cc/G97W-872H (listing enforcement actions). 
 209. Velikonja, supra note 151, at 950.  
 210. See id.  
 211. See id. (explaining that case categorization is within the discretion of 
the enforcement staff at the first instance, and then reviewed by the Office of 
the Secretary, which can lead to inconsistencies in categorization from year to 
year). 
 212. Relief defendants were excluded from the analysis. 
 213. Criminal enforcement actions were identified in a number of ways, 
including searches for Department of Justice press releases, media articles, 
and docket searches. 
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administrative failure to supervise claim and criminal 
indictments alleging obstruction of justice were not included in 
the sample.214 I also omitted cases against unknown purchasers 
of securities, which typically seek to freeze assets, but do not 
allege enough details about the underlying claim for proper 
analysis.  
Members of the same insider trading network might be 
sued or indicted over a multi-year period. To ensure that each 
member of a network was included in the dataset, I added any 
cases filed before FY 2011 and after FY 2015 if they involved 
insider trading episodes enforced during the study period.215 
The earliest cases in the dataset are thus from FY 2008. Every 
effort was made to identify all insider trading cases; there is no 
evidence that the data collection methodology biased the sample 
in any way. The case selection process yielded a total of 465 
defendants in the dataset.  
The database compiles three categories of information 
regarding each defendant: (1) litigation characteristics; (2) 
defendant characteristics; and (3) the nature of the allegations. 
Litigation specific information, such as filing dates and 
outcomes, were collected for each identified proceeding.  
A more detailed description of the variables analyzed 
appears in the data appendix. Insider trading enforcement can 
occur in three forums: (1) criminal enforcement in federal court; 
(2) civil enforcement in the same venue; and (3) proceedings 
brought before administrative law judges (ALJs).216 Cases with 
 
 214. See, e.g., Indictment at 3–4, United States v. McClellan, 10-cr-00860 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010), ECF No. 1 (indictment for obstruction of justice). 
 215. Earlier cases were not included in the sample if the only action in the 
study period was a follow-on administrative proceeding against a regulated 
person. See, e.g., Holzer, Exchange Act Release No. 63822, 2011 SEC LEXIS 
595 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
 216. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 11-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78t(e)) (empowering the SEC to obtain civil penalties against 
non-regulated persons in administrative proceedings). The use of ALJs and 
the shift of traditional civil enforcement actions to administrative proceedings 
have been controversial. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) 
(finding method for appointing ALJs unconstitutional); see generally Stephen 
J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An 
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some sort of criminal enforcement make up 39.8 percent of the 
sample.217 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample 
and shows significant differences between cases with and 












 (n = 280) (n = 185)   
A. Litigation Characteristics 
 
   
FINRA     0.068 
  No 110 (41.0%) 92 (49.7%)   
  Yes 158 (59.0%) 93 (50.3%)   
FBI   <0.001 
  No 210 (78.4%) 42 (22.7%)   
  Yes 58 (21.6%) 143 (77.3%)   
ORSA     0.005 
  No 201 (75.0%) 116 (62.7%)   
  Yes 67 (25.0%) 69 (37.3%)   
SEC Market Abuse     0.005 
  No 227 (84.7%) 137 (74.1%)   
  Yes 41 (15.3%) 48 (25.9%)   
Lag (Days) 1180.450 (566) 1064.708 (550)   0.033 
Case Length (Days) 250.656 (410) 625.285 (489) <0.001 
Enforcement Type   <0.001 
  Civil 221 (78.9%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Criminal 0 (0.0%) 7 (3.8%)   
 
Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2017); Alexander I. Platt, SEC 
Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1 (2016). 
Still, it is important to keep those controversies in perspective; defendants in 
stand-alone administrative actions were less than 7 percent of all defendants. 
See infra Table 1.  
 217. Defendants facing all three types of enforcement are overwhelmingly 
(70.8 percent) SMPs. Most administrative proceedings are follow-on actions to 
bar defendants from the securities industry or, for non-SMPs, to bar them from 
appearing or practicing before the Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) 
(2020). 
        










  SEC Administrative 29 (10.4%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Civil and Criminal 0 (0.0%) 112 (60.5%)   
  Civil and Administrative 30 (10.7%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Civil Criminal  
Administrative 
0 (0.0%) 63 (34.1%)   
  Criminal and  
Administrative 
 
0 (0.0%) 3 (1.6%)   
B. Defendant Characteristics 
 
   
Defendant Type   <0.001 
  Officer & Director 36 (12.9%) 12 (6.5%)   
  Other Employee 41 (14.6%) 30 (16.2%)   
  SMP 32 (11.4%) 68 (36.8%)   
  Lawyer 5 (1.8%) 8 (4.3%)   
  Other Professional 20 (7.1%) 10 (5.4%)   
  Friends and Family 125 (44.6%) 52 (28.1%)   
  Other 21 (7.5%) 5 (2.7%)   
Gender     0.051 
  Male 261 (93.2%) 180 (97.3%)   
  Female 19 (6.8%) 5 (2.7%)   
Direct Profit (000s 2016 
Dollars) 
1,105.62 (9195) 817.97 (2750)   0.68 
Downstream Profit (000s 
2016 Dollars) 
 
1,555.37 (17235) 7,046.95 (24318)   0.005 
C. Nature of Allegations 
 
   
Basis of Liability   <0.001 
  Trading 88 (31.4%) 13 (7.0%)   
  Tipping Only 33 (11.8%) 58 (31.4%)   
  Trading after Tip Only 102 (36.4%) 49 (26.5%)   
  Trading and Tipping 57 (20.4%) 65 (35.1%)   
# of IT Events 2.600 (12) 5.098 (7)   0.010 
Network Size 3.929 (3) 7.432 (5) <0.001 
Security Traded   <0.001 
        










  Common Shares 169 (60.4%) 64 (34.6%)   
  Options or Other 
Derivatives 
35 (12.5%) 26 (14.1%)   
  No Trading 34 (12.1%) 54 (29.2%)   
  Common Shares & Options 42 (15.0%) 41 (22.2%)   
Concealment/Obstruction   <0.001 
  No 239 (85.4%) 115 (62.2%)   
  Yes 41 (14.6%) 70 (37.8%)   
Level     0.012 
  0 99 (35.4%) 52 (28.1%)   
  1 113 (40.4%) 68 (36.8%)   
  2 55 (19.6%) 41 (22.2%)   
  3 7 (2.5%) 17 (9.2%)   
  4 5 (1.8%) 7 (3.8%)   
  5 1 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%)   
MNPI     0.003 
  Financial Information 44 (15.7%) 54 (29.2%)   
  M & A Activity 200 (71.4%) 113 (61.1%)   
  Product Approval 13 (4.6%) 10 (5.4%)   
  Other 23 (8.2%) 8 (4.3%)   
Industry   <0.001 
  Automotive 1 (0.4%) 3 (1.6%)   
  Aviation 6 (2.1%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Banking & Financial 
Services 
17 (6.1%) 6 (3.2%)   
  Biotechnology 46 (16.4%) 39 (21.1%)   
  Chemicals 9 (3.2%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Food & Beverage 13 (4.6%) 1 (0.5%)   
  Healthcare 7 (2.5%) 1 (0.5%)   
  Hospitality & Tourism 13 (4.6%) 2 (1.1%)   
  Insurance 24 (8.6%) 2 (1.1%)   
  IT & High Technology 62 (22.1%) 82 (44.3%)   
  Media 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.5%)   
  Medical Equipment 17 (6.1%) 16 (8.6%)   
  Metal Works 11 (3.9%) 8 (4.3%)   
  Mining 3 (1.1%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Oil & Gas 11 (3.9%) 4 (2.2%)   
        










  Pharmaceuticals 3 (1.1%) 1 (0.5%)   
  Property & Development 7 (2.5%) 0 (0.0%)   
  Retail 16 (5.7%) 3 (1.6%)   
  Shipping 1 (0.4%) 5 (2.7%)   
  Telecommunications 5 (1.8%) 2 (1.1%)   
  Apparel & Textiles 1 (0.4%) 6 (3.2%)  
  Other 6 (2.1%) 3 ( 1.6%)   
Duty     0.46 
  N/A 205 (73.2%) 139 (75.1%)   
  Employment 32 (11.4%) 26 (14.1%)   
  Family Relationship 13 (4.6%) 2 (1.1%)   
  Friendship 7 (2.5%) 3 (1.6%)   
  Confidentiality Agreement 8 (2.9%) 4 (2.2%)   
  Traditional Fiduciary 12 (4.3%) 10 (5.4%)   
  Other 2 (0.7%) 1 (0.5%)   
  Unknown 1 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%)   
Note: For sources and descriptions of variables, see data appendix. For 
categorical data, parentheticals are percent of total. For continuous data, 
parentheticals are standard deviations. Due to missing data, not all 
categories total to 465. 
 
V.  Materiality in Insider Trading Cases 
To analyze the claim that enforcers stretch doctrinal 
boundaries, I begin with the most rudimentary requirement of 
any insider trading case. To prevail, enforcers must show the 
defendant possessed MNPI.218 Materiality is governed, for the 
most part, by flexible, case-specific standards.  Courts generally 
define information as material if either “there is substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important” in buying or selling the security or if there is a 
substantial likelihood that the information “would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
 
 218. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2020). 
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altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”219 When 
that information is speculative or contingent, materiality 
judgments require “a balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the 
event in light of the totality of the company activity.”220 Both the 
SEC221 and courts222 have consistently rejected rules of thumb 
and bright-line rules in favor of a fact-specific, case-by-case 
assessment.223  
Insider trading critics argue that flexible standards create 
substantial uncertainties for market participants224 and allow 
enforcement officials to stretch the proper boundaries of insider 
trading doctrine.225 The “lack of a clear and objective standard,” 
John Anderson writes, “permits almost any information to be 
deemed material for purposes of insider trading liability.”226 
Professor Anderson suggests that the SEC has resisted efforts 
 
 219. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 220. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (citing SEC v. Tex. 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d. Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969)). 
 221. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 
19, 1999) (rejecting the use of a 5 percent threshold in determining the 
materiality of misstatements or omissions in financial statements). 
 222. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2011) 
(rejecting a bright-line rule that reports of adverse events associated with a 
pharmaceutical company’s products cannot be material absent a statistically 
significant risk that the product is causing the events); Basic, 485 U.S. at 
237– 39 (rejecting a bright-line rule that preliminary merger negotiations are 
material only when the parties reach an agreement in principle). 
 223. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 (“Whether merger discussions in any 
particular case are material . . . depends on the facts.”). 
 224. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of 
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2003) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Materiality Guidance] (“[T]he imprecise existing legal 
standard defining what is ‘material’ makes it difficult for those issuers, 
directors and officers to understand their legal obligations.”). 
 225. See Peter J. Henning, What’s so Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 
BUS. LAW. 751, 771–72 (2015) (arguing that the flexible materiality definition 
“allows the prohibition to be applied to new types of data that have not been 
subject to prosecutions before and to reach persons far removed from the 
traditional corporate world”). 
 226. ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62; see Henning, supra note 225, at 771 
(claiming that “[j]ust about any nugget of information could conceivably fit” 
the materiality definition).  
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to clarify materiality because the current flexible standard 
facilitates its enforcement efforts and those of prosecutors.227 
Others have urged the Commission or judges to adopt safe 
harbor provisions, bright-line rules, or presumptions to address 
these uncertainties.228  
Although commentators raise a host of objections, two 
related problems are central to complaints about materiality. 
The heart of the issue is the hindsight bias problem inherent to 
all materiality determinations.229 Enforcers and ultimately 
juries will only assess materiality if the information led to a 
profitable trade.230 But what seems certain in hindsight may not 
have been so clear when the trading decision occurred.231 Critics 
also complain that courts bootstrap—that they infer materiality 
from the fact of trading,232 effectively conflating materiality with 
a separate element, the purchase or sale of a security.233  
 
 227. See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62 (“Such flexibility can be quite 
useful to the SEC and prosecutors. Consequently, it should come as no 
surprise that the SEC has openly resisted efforts to bring greater clarity to the 
definition of materiality.”). 
 228. See Heminway, Materiality Guidance, supra note 224, at 1135 
(suggesting the “expanded use of per se rules, presumptions, and safe harbor 
provisions”). 
 229. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 
788 (2004).  
 230. See id. at 774 (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and 
mistake. People consistently overstate what could have been predicted after 
events have unfolded . . . .”). 
 231. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 67 
(2014) (discussing the importance of determining when the information in 
question became material); see also Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the 
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 
BUS. LAW. 317, 323 (2007) (explaining the role of predictions in trading 
decisions). 
 232. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d. Cir. 1968) 
(en banc) (explaining that “a major factor in determining whether” information 
is material “is the importance attached to the [information] by those who knew 
about it,” and that an insider’s choice to trade alone can serve as an indication 
of such importance). 
 233. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 68 (“If the allegedly illegal trade 
proves that the information is material, the materiality requirement becomes 
meaningless because all information in the defendant’s possession when he or 
she traded would be material.”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
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Is there evidence that these are widespread problems? 
Critics largely focus on the possibility that enforcers could 
exploit current standards, and there is no doubt that they are 
right about that possibility. But there is little evidence enforcers 
actually do so in practice. 
As Table 2 shows, two types of MNPI dominate in the 465 
insider trading cases in the dataset: (1) information about 
impending M&A activity, which appears in two-thirds of 
enforcement actions against individual defendants;234 and (2) 
financial information (typically unannounced quarterly results), 
alleged in slightly more than 20 percent of cases. The only other 
category that appears with any frequency is information about 
product approvals or testing, usually information involving new 
drug applications, which appears in about 5 percent of cases. In 
total, over 93 percent of insider trading cases involve one of 
these three categories of MNPI. 
 
Table 2 
Nature of MNPI 
 
 Overall Non-Criminal Criminal 
M & A Activity 313 (67.31) 200 (71.43) 113 (67.31) 
Financial Information 98 (21.08) 44 (15.71) 98 (21.08) 
Product Approval 23 (4.95) 13 (4.64) 23 (4.95) 
Other 31 (6.67) 823 (8.21) 
 
31 (6.67) 
Total 465  280  185  
Note: For data definitions and sources see Data Appendix. Numbers in 
parentheses are column percentages.   
 
 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975) (providing that disclosure of material 
information and the purchasing or selling a security are two separate elements 
of insider trading).  
 234. Although these percentages have shifted over the years, there is a 
remarkable consistency in the cases enforcers pursue. A study of SEC 
enforcement actions in the 1980s found that nearly 80 percent involved M&A 
activity, with another 8 percent focused on earnings information. Lisa K. 
Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 
1670 (1992).  
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All three share an important characteristic—in the 
majority of cases there is little doubt about materiality. In the 
terminology of recent insider trading cases, they 
overwhelmingly involved “black edge,” information that is 
clearly material and nonpublic and which creates a substantial 
risk of liability.235 These data are consistent with a theory of 
enforcement risk aversion—cases involving obvious MNPI will 
be far less risky to pursue.236 Indeed, by focusing their efforts on 
these cases, enforcers appear to have adopted in practice 
precisely the constrained materiality standard that critics have 
sought. Nor does this restricted view seem like a recent 
phenomenon. As James Park has noted, some early insider 
trading decisions focused their discussions of materiality on 
information that was “extraordinary in nature” and “reasonably 
certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the 
security.”237 
The three types of cases that predominate in insider trading 
enforcement actions are discussed in greater detail below.238 
A.  M&A Cases 
Under Basic’s probability-magnitude test, M&A 
transactions are usually significant events, especially for the 
company being acquired, even if their probability is low.239 For 
 
 235. See KOLHATKAR, supra note 37, at 106 (“If traders came into 
possession of this sort of information, the stock should be restricted 
immediately—at least in theory.”). 
 236. See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.  
 237. James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory 
Disclosure, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1183 (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 
565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 238. The cases in the Other category also generally involve clearly 
material information. See, e.g., Geist, Exchange Act Release No. 73581, 2014 
SEC LEXIS 4316 (Nov. 12, 2014) (award of U.S. Army contract); SEC Charges 
Former BP Employee with Insider Trading During the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, Litigation Release No. 22975, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1352 (Apr. 17, 2014) 
(extent of BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill). 
 239. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (“Since a merger 
in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a small 
corporation’s life . . . inside information . . . can become material at an earlier 
stage than [it would in] lesser transactions . . . .” (quoting SEC v. Geon Indus., 
531 F.2d 39, 47–48 (1976)). 
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82.7 percent of the defendants who traded on MNPI about an 
impending transaction, the information in their possession 
involved the company’s acquisition. In many of these cases, the 
acquisition target was a relatively small public company being 
acquired by a substantially larger one. The transaction typically 
had advanced reasonably far, increasing the chances that it 
would occur. In these circumstances, it was not difficult for the 
defendants to anticipate a large price impact on disclosure. 
These are not cases of materiality by hindsight. 
The trading surrounding General Electric’s acquisition of 
Vital Signs, Inc. provides a typical example.240 In 2008, Vital 
Signs was a medical equipment manufacturer with a market 
capitalization of under $1 billion.241 A Vital Signs executive vice 
president helped negotiate the acquisition and signed a 
non-disclosure agreement.242 After the companies agreed on 
terms, he tipped the acquisition price to his cousin, a registered 
representative, who in turn tipped five others.243 Vital Signs’ 
stock price increased 26 percent on the day the deal was 
announced.244 There was nothing uncertain about materiality in 
this case. Numerous other enforcement actions are factually 
similar.245 
 
 240. SEC Charges Eight Individuals with Making $450,000 from Insider 
Trading in Vital Signs, Inc., Litigation Release No. 22205, 2011 SEC LEXIS 
4498 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 241. Scott Malone, GE to Acquire Vital Signs for $860 Million Cash, 
REUTERS (July 24, 2008, 7:37 AM), https://perma.cc/2HQZ-2M6J (PDF). 
 242. Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Easom, No. 11-cv-7314 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2011), 
ECF No. 1. 
 243. See id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 244. See id. ¶ 2. 
 245. See, e.g., SEC Charges Five Physicians with Insider Trading in Stock 
of Medical Professional Liability Insurer, Litigation Release No. 22413, 2012 
SEC LEXIS 2135 (July 10, 2012) (chairman shared acquisition information 
with family members and friends); SEC Charges Biotech Employee, Two 
Stockbrokers with Insider Trading on Nonpublic Information About 
Pharmaceutical Trials and Merger, Litigation Release No. 23279, 2015 SEC 
LEXIS 2284 (June 9, 2015) (executive tipped brother-in-law about company’s 
acquisition); SEC Charges Former Loan Officer with Oak Hill Financial, Inc. 
and Three Others with Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 22234, 2012 
SEC LEXIS 237 (Jan. 24, 2012) (employee tipped friend about impending 
acquisition). 
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One reason that M&A cases predominate in enforcement 
actions is because of the methods the SEC and SROs use to 
detect insider trading. A substantial number of the SEC’s M&A 
cases come from FINRA market surveillance, which operates 
the Insider Trading Surveillance Group within its Office of 
Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence (OFDMI).246 When 
SROs identify cases with suspicious trading, they refer those 
cases to the SEC for further potential investigation.247  
While enforcement officials tend to be discreet regarding 
the inner workings of their algorithms, available information 
indicates that their analyses are typically tied to significant 
corporate announcements.248 While any corporate event can 
potentially be material, data surrounding M&A transactions is 
often regarded by regulators as the most material and the most 
likely to result in insider trading.249 FINRA opens investigations 
after more than 90 percent of announced mergers.250 As it 
describes the process: “When a major announcement comes out, 
the OFDMI team can go back and see if the software picked up 
any unusual movements in the stock prices of the companies 
involved.”251 As a result, 65.9 percent of the cases involving 
 
 246. See Catching the Bad Guys: Inside FINRA’s Office of Fraud Detection 
and Market Intelligence, FINRA (Sept. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/5S2H-ZNWT 
[hereinafter Catching the Bad Guys] (exploring the “inner workings” of 
OFDMI); Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech: 
All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal Actions 
to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/W7ZF-88PN (stating 
that many insider trading cases start out as a referral from FINRA); see also 
L. HILTON FOSTER, U.S. SEC, INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATIONS 3–4 (2000), 
https://perma.cc/57WW-UDF2 (PDF) (reporting the sources of cases). All of 
these investigators use data mining techniques to find suspicious trading 
patterns.  
 247. See FOSTER, supra note 246, at 3 (“SROs provide the SEC with 
hundreds of reports of suspicious trading each year.”). 
 248. Id. at 2. 
 249. Hawke Interview, supra note 53. 
 250. See Ben Protess, For Wall Street Watchdog, All Grunt Work, Little 
Glory, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/B3PP-KVGJ (discussing FINRA’s role in insider trading 
prosecutions).  
 251. Catching the Bad Guys, supra note 246; see How FINRA’s 
Surveillance Helped Score a Hole in One in “Golf Lingo” Insider Trading Case, 
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M&A activity come, at least in part, from a tip from FINRA. 
Enforcement officials necessarily evaluate materiality 
retrospectively, but by limiting their surveillance efforts to 
cases with these kinds of announcements, there seems to be 
little risk that hindsight bias will color their materiality 
judgments. 
The materiality of the information at issue in the average 
enforcement action is apparent from the market reaction when 
the information is made public. Indeed, information about 
forthcoming M&A announcements tends to be the most material 
and, as such, typically receives the most attention from SEC 
enforcement attorneys looking to build an insider trading 
case.252 Even critics of insider trading enforcement agree that 
such market reactions are the “most objective evidence of 
materiality.”253 While the absence of a market reaction might be 
due to a number of factors,254 a substantial market reaction is 
strong evidence that the disclosed information is material.255  
Much like securities class action attorneys, the SEC uses 
market reaction as a screen in choosing which investigations to 
pursue. Former enforcement officials report that the SEC 
generally looks for cases with price movements of 10 percent or 
more as a proxy for materiality.256 The existence of this kind of 
screen is borne out in the data. Kenneth Ahern examined stock 
returns in insider trading cases and found that enforcers tend 
to focus on cases that exhibit large post-disclosure returns.257 
Ahern found that enforcement cases involving corporate deals 
 
FINRA (Jan. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XVS5-7ND9 (explaining that after 
algorithms detect unusual trading patterns before major corporate 
announcements, investigators compile an “Identification List” of those who 
placed suspicious trades). 
 252. Hawke Interview, supra note 53. 
 253. Sauer, supra note 231, at 323.  
 254. See generally Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of Event Studies 
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2018). 
 255. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 256. FOSTER, supra note 246, at 4. 
 257. Kenneth R. Ahern, Information Networks: Evidence from Illegal 
Insider Trading Tips, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 26, 45 (2017); Patrick Augustin et al., 
Informed Option Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, 65 
MGMT. SCI. 5697, 5717 (2019) (showing a positive correlation between 
cumulative abnormal return and the likelihood of a SEC enforcement action). 
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had average returns of 34.9 percent over 21.3 trading days (the 
length of time from the day following the first alleged tip to the 
event date).258 Because M&A transactions take time to 
negotiate, tips in those cases occur on average a month before 
the public announcement.259 The average return over that 
period was 43.1 percent.260 Although these cases often had 
substantial pre-announcement run-ups, the mean (median) 
announcement day returns were still substantial, 21.9 percent 
(11.0 percent).261  
It is important to emphasize that these data come from filed 
cases. There may well be insider trading prior to transactions 
that result in smaller market reactions. These cases may never 
come to the attention of enforcement authorities. Even if they 
do, enforcers may choose not to file actions because of concerns 
about their ability to prove materiality. For present purposes, it 
is enough to note that the screening processes enforcers use tend 
to ensure that they will not typically bring cases involving 
information of questionable materiality.262 In fact, these 
 
 258. Ahern, supra note 257, at 31–32. 
 259. Id. at 28. 
 260. Id. at 32. 
 261. See id. at tbl.1 (displaying the mean and median announcement day 
returns for M&A corporate events). 
 262. Typically does not mean never. There are cases in the dataset in 
which enforcers took aggressive materiality positions. A good example is the 
enforcement action against Canadian investment banker Richard Moore. See 
Complaint ¶ 10, SEC v. Moore, No. 13-cv-02514 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), ECF 
No. 1 (alleging insider trading against investment banker). One of Moore’s 
primary clients was the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (the 
“CPPIB). Id. ¶ 1. Moore had worked with his friend, a Managing Director of 
CPPIB, on a number of transactions, and learned from him that CPPIB was 
working on a potential acquisition. Id. The Managing Director provided Moore 
with no material information about the acquisition target, but Moore learned 
that he had been traveling to London in connection with the potential deal. Id. 
¶ 19. At a charity event, Moore spotted the Managing Director with the CEO 
of London-based Tompkins plc and surmised that it was the target. Id. ¶ 20. 
Moore purchased Tompkins ADRs and made a profit of $163,293. SEC 
Charges Former Investment Banker with Insider Trading, Litigation Release 
No. 22674, 2013 SEC LEXIS 1120 (Apr. 16, 2013). Moore settled the action a 
week later. Final Judgment as to Richard Bruce Moore at 2, SEC v. Moore, 
No. 13-cv-02514 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), ECF No. 3. Although Moore obtained 
some confidential information, it is hard to see how it was material. Indeed, 
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processes may create under- not over-enforcement. If 
information is material but there is, for whatever reason, a more 
muted market response when public disclosure occurs, then 
significant insider trading may go undetected or unpunished. 
Such a situation could arise, for example, when significant 
tipping occurs after the initial trades, leading to a substantial 
price run-up prior to announcement.263 
B.  Financial Information Cases 
Cases based on financial information were prominent parts 
of the recent crackdown involving hedge funds and expert 
networks.264 Indeed, as shown in Table 1 there is a significantly 
higher proportion of financial information cases involving 
criminal (29.2 percent) as opposed to exclusively civil 
enforcement (15.7 percent). Not surprisingly, these cases derive 
more frequently from FBI investigations (56.3 percent) rather 
than from FINRA surveillance (25.0 percent).  
The majority of these cases involve short-term 
developments from which a trader could derive a definitive 
prediction about the direction and size of the company’s stock 
price.265 As James Park has noted, trading on this kind of 
information undermines the integrity of the mandatory 
disclosure system.266 Often the information in these cases 
involves quarterly financial results or other information with a 
 
this appears to be the classic situation in which a “skilled analyst with 
knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly 
inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which 
reveals material non-public information.” Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 
F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). While this seems quite clearly to be an aggressive 
interpretation, this kind of case is the exception rather than the rule.  
 263. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 44 (stating that insider trading profits 
decrease as the length of the tipping chain increases). 
 264. See infra Table 1; see also Benjamin Bain, Hedge Fund Woes After 
U.S. Crackdown Don’t Surprise SEC’s Chair, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2016) 
https://perma.cc/47KS-T4KJ (describing the large number of recent 
convictions as a “golden era for insider trading”).  
 265. See Park, supra note 237, at 1164–65 (stating that release of financial 
records has short-term implications for a company’s value). 
 266. Id. at 1136. 
        
REAL INSIDER TRADING  1695 
 
high probability of affecting the company’s stock price.267 
Consider, for example, the case against Steven Dombrowski, 
who worked in a corporate audit department.268 He learned that 
his company’s first quarter results were worse than expected 
and that the company would miss its earnings target.269 In 
violation of the company’s insider trading policy, Dombrowski 
sold his stock short and bought put options through his wife’s 
brokerage account.270 He profited substantially when the stock 
dropped 35.7 percent on the news.271  
There is little doubt about the materiality of this kind of 
information, especially in situations like this one where results 
were out of line with market expectations.272 These trades or 
tips generally occurred over a short timeframe—just 11.3 days 
in Ahern’s study.273 Because this information is subject to 
mandatory reporting obligations and disclosed quarterly, there 
is little policy justification for permitting tipping and trading on 
it because those activities do almost nothing to improve 
allocative efficiency. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor 
Fischel have noted, quarterly earnings provide great 
opportunities for profitable trading, but trading “on news that 
is bound to come out anyway does not change the future or lead 
to better investment in new securities.”274 The stock price will 
ultimately change when the company files.275 “That it changes a 
day or so quicker is not of much moment for allocative 
 
 267. Id. at 1139. 
 268. Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Dombrowski, No. 14-cv-00622 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
28, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. 
 272. See Bradford Cornell & Wayne R. Landsman, Security Price Response 
to Quarterly Earnings Announcements and Analysts’ Forecast Revisions, 64 
ACCT. REV. 680, 680 (1989) (“To the extent that earnings announcements are 
unanticipated, they are likely to provide new information about future cash 
flow and, thus, to alter the value of the firm.”). 
 273. Ahern, supra note 257, at 32 tbl.1. 
 274. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 288 (1996). 
 275. Id. 
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efficiency.”276 Bringing cases based on this kind of MNPI is well 
within existing legal doctrines. 
The salience of the information in these cases also derives 
from the industries in which trading is concentrated. Two 
industries—High Technology and, to a lesser degree 
Retail— dominate financial information cases. As shown in 
Table 3, 63.3 percent of the defendants traded in the securities 
of High Technology issuers. Another 8.2 percent traded in Retail 
securities. The stock prices of companies in these industries 
tend to be particularly sensitive to earnings and other financial 
news, further suggesting that those trading on the information 
were aware of its materiality.277 
 
Table 3 
Financial Information Cases by Industry 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
IT & High Technology 62 63.27 63.27 
Retail 8 8.16 71.43 
Oil & Gas 5 5.10 76.53 
Apparel & Textiles 5 5.10 81.63 
Biotechnology 4 4.08 85.71 
Other 14 14.29 100.00 
Total 98   
Note: Cases against individual defendants traded on the basis of MNPI 
concerning financial results. Multiple defendants traded in the same stocks, 
so percentages do not reflect industry frequency. 
 
Still, in Ahern’s study, earnings announcements had the 
smallest average returns—13.5 percent.278 They also had the 
smallest pre-announcement run-up (9.2 percent) and the 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. The sensitivity of companies in these industries to unexpected 
financial results is why allegations involving misrepresentations of earnings 
or similar data figure so prominently in securities class actions as well. See 
generally Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism through Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class 
Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368 (2012). 
 278. Ahern, supra note 257, at 32 tbl.1. 
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smallest announcement day returns (7.0 percent).279 While 
these data might suggest that enforcers employ a more 
capacious definition of materiality for financial information, 
there is another possibility.  
In my dataset, which overlaps in time with the one Ahern 
employs, nearly 30 percent of the defendants trading on 
financial information (28.6 percent) were SMPs. These 
defendants can be expected to trade larger amounts leading to 
larger potential pre-announcement price increases. Indeed, the 
average total profits alleged in the sample are about 3.5 times 
larger for the financial information cases as for the M&A cases. 
Insider trading cases involving SMPs also have significantly 
higher trading profits than cases with other defendants.280 The 
lower event day returns may thus be the product of greater 
run-up rather than from the greater frequency of cases in which 
enforcers base their claims on marginally material 
information.281 
C.  Product Approval Cases 
As with M&A cases, there is usually little doubt about 
materiality in the 5 percent of cases involving product 
approvals. The twenty-three cases in the sample involved ten 
separate companies, all of which were either biotechnology or 
medical equipment manufacturers.282 These were usually small 
companies, often with a single product in the FDA approval 
process.283 A typical example involved trading in GTx, Inc., a 
 
 279. Id.  
 280. The average total profit (both the direct profit to the defendant and 
the profit earned by downstream tippees) for cases with SMPs was $9.7 million 
(in real 2016 dollars) compared to $3.3 million in cases without such 
defendants. These differences are significant at about 1 percent. 
 281. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 43 (stating that insider trading has a 
significant effect on stock prices, moving them closer to their fundamental 
values). 
 282. Companies were classified by industry using their SIC codes. Of the 
ten companies, six manufacture Pharmaceutical Preparations (2834), three 
make Biological Products (2836), and one produced Medical Equipment (3829). 
 283. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Chu, No. 14-cv-00995 (C.D. Cal. May 
19, 2014), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Lama, No. 14-cv-00996 (C.D. Cal. 
May 19, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
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biotechnology company with a prostate cancer drug in Phase II 
clinical trials.284 Two doctors were lead investigators.285 Within 
minutes of learning that the FDA suspended those trials due to 
safety concerns, they sold a significant number of shares.286 The 
next day, when the company publicly disclosed the hold, its 
stock price dropped 36 percent.287 
In terms of market reaction, GTx is a typical product case. 
In Ahern’s study, cases involving clinic trial and drug regulatory 
announcements had the largest average returns over the 
shortest time period.288 Unlike M&A transactions, which may 
develop over many months and which may therefore create 
longer periods for tipping and trading, clinical trial results are 
usually disclosed quickly. Thus, trading in this MNPI does little 
to benefit allocative efficiency. But, given the importance of 
these products for the companies involved, the stock market 
effects are even greater than for M&A transactions. Gains from 
positive news events averaged 101.2 percent, while losses 
avoided for negative ones averaged 38.6 percent.289 The average 
holding period was just 9.2 days.290  
The product approval cases provide a good illustration of 
another flaw in a common critique of insider trading 
enforcement—that enforcers and courts use the fact of trading 
alone to demonstrate materiality, effectively combining two 
elements (purchase or sale and materiality) into a single 
element. This critique is simply inaccurate. Enforcers and 
courts do not focus on the fact of the trade in isolation, but on 
the trade within the broader factual context of the case. Among 
the circumstantial evidence that complaints and court decisions 
highlight are the speed with which the defendant acts on the 
 
 284. See SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider 
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014) 
(detailing charges against two urologists for insider trading on a 
biopharmaceutical company). 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See Ahern, supra note 257, at 32. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See id.  
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tipped information,291 the size of the trade,292 the type of security 
traded,293 and how the trade compared to the defendant’s prior 
history of trading.294 The simple fact that an individual trades 
rarely stands in isolation as the only evidence of materiality. 
D.  The Limits of Insider Trading Enforcement 
The overwhelming focus on suspicious trading prior to 
dramatic market events likely creates a problem of 
under- rather than over-enforcement. To see why, consider the 
old joke about the policeman who comes across a drunk looking 
for his lost set of keys under a streetlamp.295 The policeman joins 
the search and after a few fruitless minutes asks the drunk if he 
 
 291. See SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider 
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014) 
(involving a defendant who placed sell orders within minutes of learning that 
FDA was placing clinical trials on hold); see also Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Itri, 
No. 14-cv-02525 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging a tippee sold stock 
minutes after learning about negative clinical trial results); SEC v. Michel, 
521 F. Supp. 2d 795, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that tippee bought stock the 
morning after discussing company negotiations on a flight); United States v. 
Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing tippee’s 
instructions to wait to purchase stock until tipper provided guidance). 
 292. See Boudreault, Exchange Act Release No. 75420, 2015 SEC LEXIS 
2881 (July 10, 2015) (finding that defendant sold 100 percent of stock held in 
personal brokerage account and 40 percent of stock in IRA account after 
learning that FDA was placing hold on clinical trial); Complaint ¶¶ 4–5, SEC 
v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (alleging that 
on several days, tippee’s trades accounted for the majority of volume in entire 
market); see also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that evidence of a large trade could demonstrate use of material 
nonpublic information); United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 
2001) (describing tippee’s purchase following tip as “nearly twice as large” as 
any prior trades). 
 293. See SEC Charges Former Pharmaceutical Company Executive and 
Friend with Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 23125, 2014 SEC LEXIS 
4095 (June 30, 2017) (detailing scheme where tippee invested in spread bets, 
which allowed him to profit from changes in the underlying value of the 
company’s stock and options); Complaint ¶ 9, SEC v. Cohen, No. 10-cv-02514 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (alleging that tippee purchased short-term, out-of-the 
money put options); Complaint ¶ 5, SEC v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (same). 
 294. See Boudreault, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2881, at 3 (stating that sale was 
largest single trade in four years). 
 295. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 11, 17–18 (1964). 
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is sure that was where he lost his keys. “Oh no,” the drunk 
replies, “I lost them in the park, but the light is better here.”296 
For enforcers, the streetlamp shines most brightly in M&A 
transactions and in the other contexts discussed above. 
Available evidence suggests that both the SEC and the SROs 
focus their monitoring on these situations, not necessarily 
because that is where most insider trading occurs but because 
that is where it is easiest to find and prosecute.297 This 
observational bias is not unique to enforcers. Academic studies 
also tend to focus on the same limited contexts.298  
To understand these limitations, it is necessary to focus 
somewhat more closely on the extent to which the SEC relies on 
FINRA to identify potential insider trading cases. Most criminal 
insider trading cases come from referrals from the SEC or from 
the work of the FBI.299 The majority of civil cases do not appear 
to originate from the SEC’s own investigative efforts.300 SROs 
perform the primary surveillance function, with the SEC 
supplementing those efforts with its own resources and those of 
criminal enforcement authorities.301 
SEC litigation releases typically credit either the sources of 
a filed civil case or agencies (such as the FBI) who provided 
assistance in the investigation.302 As previously shown in Table 
1 more than half of the SEC’s cases (59.0 percent) come from 
FINRA referrals. This figure likely undercounts the number of 
cases originating with FINRA. The evidence suggests the SEC 
was more consistent in referencing referrals in the later parts of 
the study period, meaning the data likely undercount earlier 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. See supra notes 252–253 and accompanying text.  
 298. See Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Insider Trading in Takeover 
Targets, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 598, 598 (2012) (“[T]akeovers are one of the most 
researched topics in finance.”). 
 299. See Mary Jo White, supra note 246 (discussing how various insider 
trading cases originated). 
 300. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155, at 2 
(describing the Enforcement Division’s daily collaboration with counterparts 
across self-regulatory organizations). 
 301. See id. at 3 (describing the SRO’s surveillance systems). 
 302. See, e.g., SEC Charges Two Clinical Drug Trial Doctors with Insider 
Trading, Litigation Release No. 22996, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1700 (May 19, 2014) 
(discussing the FDA’s role in assisting the investigation). 
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referrals. The Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority 
(ORSA), another SRO now operating under FINRA’s 
supervision, appears in 25.0 percent of litigation releases. By 
contrast, the SEC’s Market Abuse Unit is cited for its 
investigative efforts in only 15.3 percent of filed cases, often in 
conjunction with the work of the SROs.303  
It is important to consider the potential benefits and costs 
of this system. SROs are valuable to the SEC because they allow 
the agency to partially outsource its investigations and 
presumably leverage the resources it deploys for detecting 
violations.304 Beyond such institutional benefits, SROs provide 
individualized benefits for risk-averse enforcement attorneys. 
For these attorneys, the more uncertainty associated with case 
outcomes, the greater pressure there is to pursue safer choices. 
Receiving a pre-packaged case from FINRA pinpointing a highly 
unusual, albeit small, trading pattern will be hard for many 
enforcement attorneys to ignore. All things being equal, these 
matters will tend to be viewed as low-risk options. Even if the 
investigation does not lead to a successful action, it will be easier 
for the enforcement attorney to blame a faulty SRO referral 
when her actions are reviewed.  
But those benefits come with a significant cost. In 
connection with efforts that began in 2007, the SEC 
enforcement staff developed the Automated Bluesheet Analysis 
Project (“ABAP”).305 Bluesheets provide detailed, trade-level 
data about trading in the subject security, including account 
information. They are typically the starting point for insider 
 
 303. There are two reasons for the lower percentage of Market Abuse Unit 
cases. First, it is in part attributable to a reorganization of the Enforcement 
Division, which occurred during the study period. The Market Abuse Unit did 
not exist until the reorganization was announced in January 2010. Second, 
the Market Abuse Unit was formed to investigate complex, serial, and often 
hard-to-detect insider trading. It does not generally pursue traditional 
“one-off” cases. 
 304. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155 (“The 
surveillance departments at the SROs . . . use cutting-edge software programs 
to isolate unusual trading activity that may indicate insider trading.”). 
 305. See Khuzami, supra note 53 (explaining that the project helps 
enforcement staff “recognize suspicious trading patterns and identify 
relationships and connections among multiple traders and across multiple 
securities”). 
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trading investigations.306 In developing the ABAP, the SEC’s 
enforcement staff informally assessed the range of bluesheet 
coverage indicated by the number, scope, and timing of 
bluesheet requests made for trading in front of M&A 
announcements.307 By comparing those requests to the number 
of high value M&A transactions in a particular year, the staff 
observed that while regulators were historically effective in 
identifying and investigating suspicious trading based on the 
technological resources available to them, they could improve 
their bluesheet coverage and thereby expand their investigative 
reach by being more strategic in their focus on which 
transactions to bluesheet, among other things.308 In developing 
ABAP, the enforcement staff focused on traders whose trading 
patterns in the same stocks at the same time suggested that 
they potentially knew each other, had a common source of 
information, had shared MNPI, and had engaged in coordinated 
insider trading.309 Indeed, the enforcement staff’s assessment in 
developing the ABAP was that while existing surveillance 
techniques were adequate to identify opportunistic insider 
trading on a “one-off” basis, they often did not capture 
coordinated or serial trading among more sophisticated market 
participants.310 
These results led the SEC enforcement staff to rethink its 
investigative approach and to deploy ABAP to identify potential 
relationships among traders and potential common sources of 
material nonpublic information. Developing what it calls a 
“trader-based” rather than “security-based” approach, the SEC 
looks for traders who collectively exhibit unusual trading 
patterns across different securities, and then tries to find 
common sources of information or relationship that link them 
 
 306. When the SEC begins an investigation on its own initiative of as a 
result of a referral, it the sends out so-called bluesheet requests to 
broker-dealers and clearinghouses. FINRA also uses bluesheets in its 
preliminary investigations. See Electronic Blue Sheets (EBS), FINRA, 
https://perma.cc/NKZ6-8XW6 (PDF) (describing Electronic Blue Sheets and 
their role in regulatory enforcement). 
 307. Hawke Interview, supra note 53. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
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together.311 But even under this approach, the SEC must still 
prove materiality and it therefore is still likely to focus on cases 
involving significant stock price movements. Materiality 
concerns continue to play a dominant role even in cases 
investigated under the trader-based approach. For example, in 
a case against a former law firm managing clerk, many of the 
transactions alleged in the complaint had announcement 
returns of over 30 percent.312 The trader-based approach simply 
allowed the SEC to identify insider trading in additional deals 
with no or only small abnormal returns.313 And, of course, the 
case still focused on trading preceding M&A transactions.314 
To be sure, the intense focus on M&A transactions appears 
to have created some beneficial deterrent effects.315 Studying 
stock price run-ups before deal announcements, Del Guercio and 
her co-authors find a smaller price impact in the early 2000s 
than was found in studies of insider trading in the 1980s, a 
 
 311. The more frequently two traders appear to trade in front of the same 
stocks, the more likely it is that they know each other. See Todd Ehret, SEC’s 
Advanced Data Analytics Helps Detect Even the Smallest Illicit Market 
Activity, REUTERS (June 30, 2017, 1:11 PM) https://perma.cc/PB99-QXQD 
(PDF) (“In contrast to the ‘security-based’ approach, the ‘trader-based’ 
approach examines or mines ‘blue sheet’ data to detect and analyze individual 
and institutional traders to determine which securities they trade.”). 
 312. See Complaint ¶ 55, SEC v. Eydelman, No. 14-cv-01742 (D.N.J. Mar. 
19, 2014), ECF No. 1 (describing the ill-gotten gains as resulting in $5.6 
million in profits). 
 313. See Stockbroker in Post-It Note Insider Trading Case Sentenced to 36 
Months in Prison, Litigation Release No. 23667, 2016 SEC LEXIS 3721 (Sept. 
30, 2016) (detailing elaborate and covert information-passing scheme from 
tipper to tippee). 
 314. See id. (noting that the schemes involved “more than a dozen pending 
corporate transactions”). 
 315. Moves toward greater private ordering likely have also played a role. 
Black-out periods, pre-clearance for high level executives, or other policies are 
common at publicly traded companies. See J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies 
Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000). These 
private ordering mechanisms appear to deter at least some kinds of improper 
trading. See Inmoo Lee et al., Do Voluntary Corporate Restrictions on Insider 
Trading Eliminate Informed Insider Trading?, 29 J. CORP. FIN. 158, 177 
(2014). 
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result they attribute to greater fear of legal liability.316 Lisa 
Meulbroek’s study of that earlier period found an average 
abnormal return of 3.1 percent on days with insider trading.317 
By contrast, Del Guercio found average abnormal run-ups in 
their sample of cases filed between 2003 and 2011 of only 0.5 
percent, an 80 percent decrease.318 To address self-selection 
problems, the authors also looked at the impact of SEC 
enforcement intensity on the size of pre-announcement 
run-ups.319 In the 1980s, 40 percent of the abnormal return 
occurred in the twenty days before the announcement compared 
to just 10 percent in the latter years of the Del Guercio study.320  
There is little doubt that enforcement deters insider 
trading. The problem is that greater scrutiny only leads to 
greater deterrence if market participants perceive that 
enforcement activities increase the likelihood of detection.321 
This is why law enforcement strategies that crack down on 
particular crimes have been shown to be effective,322 although 
often those reductions are temporary.323 But an enforcement 
program dominated by small traders engaged in obvious 
violations may very well create the opposite perception. 
Sophisticated insider traders, like street criminals who displace 
their activities from more heavily patrolled to less heavily 
 
 316. Diane Del Guercio et al., The Deterrent Effect of SEC Enforcement 
Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading: Evidence from Run-up Before News 
Events, 60 J. L. & ECON. 269, 271 (2017). 
 317. Meulbroek, supra note 234, at 1676 tbl.v. 
 318. Del Guercio et al., supra note 316, at 271. 
 319. Id. at 272. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 784–86 (2010); 
Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1346 
(2006) (describing the components of deterrence to include perception by 
market participants). 
 322. See, e.g., Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A 
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 18–19 (2017) (detailing a policing 
strategy aimed specifically at youth violence in Boston and its expansion to 
other cities around the United States). 
 323. See Paternoster, supra note 321, at 793–94 (collecting studies). 
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patrolled neighborhoods, may simply shift their illicit trading 
strategies in ways designed to avoid detection.324  
As Kate Andrias has noted, sophisticated parties tend to be 
“aware of informal, undisclosed policies of nonenforcement or 
prioritization.”325 And it seems equally likely that they have a 
reasonably subtle appreciation for how targeted crimes are 
detected. Because detection techniques rely so heavily on the 
temporal proximity between the trade and a dramatic market 
event there are several ways that sophisticated traders could 
adopt strategies to obscure their violations. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence suggesting that traders continue to earn 
abnormal market returns through trading strategies evidently 
designed to avoid, if not detection, at least enforcement.326 For 
example, some company insiders are apparently able to avoid 
losses associated with previously uninterrupted strings of 
earnings increases by selling their shares before those breaks.327 
Rather than concentrating their sales immediately before the 
breaks, insiders shift their trading to earlier time periods,328 
which not only makes detection more difficult but creates 
additional legal hurdles for enforcers, who must show that the 
trading was on the basis of MNPI. This strategy appears to 
exploit the rules of thumb enforcers use. It is often the case that 
the closer in time trades are made before a public 
announcement, the more likely an SEC investigation will 
result.329 
In M&A transactions, the SEC tends to focus on trading in 
the common stock of the target company. Common stock trading 
 
 324. See John J. Donohue et al., Do Police Reduce Crime? A Reexamination 
of a Natural Experiment, in EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 125, 125 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2013) 
(finding that criminals move their activities when policing increases in their 
local areas). 
 325. Andrias, supra note 38, at 1098. 
 326. See Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know about Future Earnings and 
How They Use It: Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 316 
(2003) (noting traders’ awareness of trading patterns and strategies to lower 
detection). 
 327. See id. at 330 (explaining that insiders must sell before the break to 
“avoid the stock price drop which coincides with the break”).  
 328. See id. at 343. 
 329. Hawke Interview, supra note 53.  
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accounts for 55.3 percent of M&A cases in the dataset. Pure 
derivative trading is just 11.8 percent. Given the incentive 
structure of enforcement attorneys, this emphasis makes sense. 
As shown in more detail below, cases involving common share 
trading prior to M&A announcements, particularly those 
referred by FINRA, settle more quickly than other kinds of 
cases.330 These cases represent easy opportunities for 
enforcement attorneys and the agency to increase their win 
rates. 
But only the least sophisticated traders are likely to engage 
in such trading. Savvier, more experienced traders may devise 
profitable trading strategies that are subtler. For example, a 
recent study shows traders shifting to two types of derivative 
transactions: (1) out-of-the-money call options of target 
companies; and (2) at-the-money straddles of the acquiring 
companies, which have positive returns if the acquirer’s stock 
price moves in either direction. Trading volumes tend to be 
higher in larger deals with greater liquidity, conditions that 
make it easier to disguise informed trading.331 These patterns 
are consistent with sophisticated traders exploiting MNPI in 
ways that enforcers are less likely to detect or pursue.332 
As a result, for all the resources devoted to detection, to the 
extent that enforcers continue to focus predominantly on 
common stock trading before dramatic market events, they 
remain much more likely to uncover the least sophisticated 
traders engaged in the most obvious insider trading.333 Indeed, 
as computer power and analytical sophistication grow, 
investigators both at the SEC and FINRA are now able to 
 
 330. See infra Part VII.A.  
 331. See Augustin, supra note 257, at 9; Alex Frino et al., How Much Does 
an Illegal Insider Trade?, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 241, 252 (2013) (insiders decrease 
trade volumes in response to increases in the likelihood of detection). 
 332. See Jon A. Garfinkel, New Evidence on the Effects of Federal 
Regulations on Insider Trading: The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA), 3 J. CORP. FIN. 89, 96–104 (1997) (noting that there 
is evidence that informed traders shift their trading patterns in response to 
changes in penalty severity, consistent with standard deterrence theory).  
 333. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider 
Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 333 (1998) 
(explaining that the SEC will focus its enforcement resources where violations 
are most likely to have occurred and will be the easiest to prove). 
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identify small, suspicious trading anomalies that might 
previously have gone undetected.334 The referrals the SEC 
receives from SROs (Table 4) generally involve these smaller 
matters. For example, the mean (median) alleged profits in 
cases referred by FINRA are $2.39 million ($176,686), 
significantly less than the mean and median profits in cases 
from other sources ($7.94 million and $791,760).  
 
Table 4 
Total Alleged Profits in Referred Insider Trading 
Cases 
 Mean Median 
FINRA   
FINRA Referral $2,385,832** $176,686 
No FINRA Referral $7.937,938 $791,760 
ORSA   
ORSA Referral $1,709,060* $440,657 
No ORSA Referral $6,175,192 $279,031 
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001 
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Total profits are 
in inflation adjusted 2016 dollars and represent the defendant’s alleged 
profits and the profits of all other members in the same insider trading 
network. 
 
To be sure, such trading remains unlawful, and it is hard to 
argue that enforcers should not pursue such cases, particularly 
where investigation is easy, cheap, and quick.  
But it is not. SROs do not have subpoena powers.335 The 
SEC still has to investigate SRO referrals before filing a case. I 
analyzed the time between the first alleged insider trading 
event and the filing of an SEC action. The mean (median) 
 
 334. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD § 6:110 (2d ed. 2020) (stating that technological 
developments have enabled “the SEC to sift through all the ‘chatter’ of 
available financial and personal information in order to detect insider 
trading”). 
 335. See 6 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 334, § 12:192 (“[S]elf-regulatory 
organizations lack subpoena power . . . .”). 
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number of days is 1180 (1215). In other words, it takes enforcers 
on average over three years to identify, investigate, and file the 
cases they bring. We cannot directly observe the intensity of 
investigative effort over this time period.336 But SEC officials 
have repeatedly emphasized how time-consuming and 
labor-intensive insider trading investigations are.337 Whatever 
the potential mix of cases it might choose to investigate, the 
agency is devoting considerable effort to a large number of 
small, simple cases. Given all of the ways that the SEC could 
deploy its enforcement resources, it is a legitimate question 
whether pursuing these cases as extensively as it does is likely 
to be a rational and effective deterrence strategy.338 That 
question is all the more salient given that the SEC’s 
enforcement choices are almost entirely insulated from judicial 
review.339 
Indeed, the incentives to pursue small, easily resolved cases 
may be increasing. In a series of recent cases, the Supreme 
Court has applied a five-year statute of limitations on SEC 
enforcement actions seeking either civil penalties or 
disgorgement, the primary recoveries in insider trading cases.340 
While these decisions would preclude only a minority of SEC 
cases and limit the SEC’s ability to obtain disgorgement in 
others, they may create additional incentives for the agency to 
eschew long, complicated investigations of complex schemes in 
 
 336. See 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (2020) (“[A]ll formal investigative proceedings 
shall be non-public.”).  
 337. See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, supra note 155 
(describing how time intensive, “complex[,] and painstaking” insider trading 
cases can be).  
 338. See David Freeman Enstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 
YALE L.J. 616, 684 (2013) (noting that scholars have “long contended that the 
SEC tends to pursue relatively small cases in an effort to pad its success 
rate . . . rather than allocating scarce enforcement resources with an eye to 
optimizing deterrence”). 
 339. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (stating that agencies 
are endowed with considerable discretion “attributable in no small part to the 
general unsuitability for judicial review of decisions to refuse enforcement”). 
 340. See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 442 (2013) (explaining that if the 
SEC seeks civil penalties, it must file suit within five years of the date when 
the claim accrued, pursuant to a general statute of limitations); Kokesh v. 
SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1638 (2017) (stating that a five-year statute of 
limitations applies when the SEC seeks civil penalties).  
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favor of obvious cases that can be investigated and filed more 
quickly.341 
Focusing enforcement efforts on small, unsophisticated 
insider trading may do little to deter the more sophisticated 
traders who are at the heart of so much enforcement rhetoric. 
Indeed, the substantial disconnect between what enforcement 
officials say and what they actually do in practice raises 
important questions about the perceived legitimacy of insider 
trading enforcement. When enforcers’ public talk deviates from 
actual practices, they run the risk of muting or distorting the 
message prosecutions are supposed to send. We can call this 
problem “enforcement dissonance”—what enforcers claim they 
are doing does not match what they are actually doing. At some 
point, straying too far from the rhetorical underpinnings of 
enforcement might call into question the very necessity for any 
enforcement of insider trading proscriptions, precisely the 
reaction we see in both academic and popular critiques. 
VI.  The Misappropriation Theory and Duties of Trust and 
Confidence 
Few insider trading critics dispute that trading in breach of 
a traditional fiduciary duty (such as those applicable to 
employees or other agents) should give rise to liability, 
regardless of whether that action is premised on the classical or 
misappropriation theory. Similarly, the circumstances under 
which temporary constructive insiders (lawyers, investment 
bankers, accountants, and other consultants) inherit the 
abstain or disclose duty are well settled.342 More controversy 
surrounds other duties of “trust and confidence” that might give 
 
 341. See Urska Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence 
from SEC Actions, 108 GEO. L.J. 389, 431 (2019) (“The SEC’s limited resources 
mean that it cannot be everywhere at all times, so Kokesh might push the 
Agency to look for misconduct under the street light.”). 
 342. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 76 (stating that the basis for 
recognizing temporary insider status is “that they have entered into a special 
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and 
are given access to information solely for corporate purposes” (quoting Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983))). 
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rise to liability under the misappropriation theory.343 Naturally 
the question arises—how expansive are these duties and can 
market participants predict with certainty the relationships 
that create liability? 
Critics charge that enforcers take too broad a view of such 
duties and that they expand them to fit the needs of the actions 
they want to file.344 The result is a vague and uncertain liability 
standard.345 These non-traditional duties of trust and 
confidence have involved everything from familial 
relationships,346 friendships,347 and confidentiality 
agreements348 to membership in organizations like Alcoholics 
Anonymous, with either explicit or implicit expectations of 
confidentiality.349  
 
 343. See id. (“The courts and the SEC have not . . . been so clear and 
consistent in identifying who assumes a fiduciary or similar relation of trust 
and confidence under the misappropriation theory.”). 
 344.  ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 62. 
 345. See Painter, supra note 120, at 157 (“[I]t is clear that the 
misappropriation theory remains exceptionally vague as a standard for 
criminal liability.”). 
 346. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1271–73 (11th Cir. 2003) (spouses); 
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (parent and 
child), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).  
 347. See United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1, 5–7 (1st Cir. 2016) (friends). 
Most friend cases involve situations in which one friend impermissibly tips 
another. These cases are analyzed under the Dirks standard and, like other 
tipping cases, the key question is whether the tipper received a personal 
benefit. See infra Part VII.D. By contrast, misappropriation cases often involve 
one friend secretly converting MNPI for his or her personal benefit. In such 
cases, the relevant question is whether the friendship creates a duty of trust 
or confidence sufficient for liability under the misappropriation theory. See 
McPhail, 831 F.3d at 5–7 (outlining the relationship between McPhail and 
Santamaria, from whom he obtained the classified information, and 
determining that there was an established level of trust and confidence 
between the two that was subsequently breached by McPhail).  
 348. See SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489, 491 (N.D. Tex. 2005) 
(concluding that MPNI learned by a tax and financial planning consultant was 
confidential even though the parties had not yet entered into a contract for 
those services).  
 349. See United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that the expectation of confidentially engendered between two 
parties connected through Alcoholics Anonymous that resulted in one trading 
on MPNI learned in the confines of that relationship violated Rule 10b-5); SEC 
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Front and center in this critique is the SEC’s adoption of 
Rule 10b5-2.350 Promulgated in the wake of United States v. 
Chestman351 and other cases that tried to cabin the reach of the 
misappropriation theory,352 the rule defines three non-exclusive 
situations that give rise to the requisite duty of trust and 
confidence: (1) whenever a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence; (2) whenever there is a “history, 
pattern, or practice” of sharing confidential information that 
gives rise to an expectation of confidentiality; and (3) between 
close family members, specifically a “spouse, parent, child, or 
sibling.”353 Commentators have questioned the validity of at 
least some aspects of Rule 10b5-2, primarily asserting that the 
SEC does not have the authority to extend liability beyond 
traditional fiduciary duties or duties of trust and confidence that 
are “similar” to traditional fiduciary duties.354 Under this view, 
only relationships that involve both discretionary authority and 
dependency are sufficiently similar to warrant potential 
 
v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (confirming the existence 
of an express duty of confidentiality among members of CEO Roundtable). But 
see United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012–13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(holding that trading on MPNI learned through membership in Young 
Presidents Organization did not give rise to misappropriation liability). 
 350. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2020). 
 351. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 352. See id. at 567 (stating that the court will “tread cautiously in 
extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships, lest our efforts to 
construe Rule 10b-5 lose method and predictability”); Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,602 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (citing 
Chestman). 
 353. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b) (2020).  
 354. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 104 (stating that there is “some 
doubt as to the validity of the Rule” and that that courts should be “loath” to 
employ this phraseology as an expansion method).   
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liability.355 For the most part, courts have found Rule 10b5-2 to 
be a proper exercise of delegated authority.356 
Whatever the merits of those arguments, what have 
securities enforcers actually done in practice? Are there large 
numbers of cases premised on overly broad interpretations of 
duties of trust and confidence? Are there significant differences 
between civil and criminal cases? 
The data presented here only partially support existing 
critiques. As Table 5 shows, there were 121 defendants in the 
sample who were alleged to have misappropriated MNPI in 
breach of a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence owed 
to the source of the information. For the most part these cases 
were unexceptionable. Nearly half of the defendants were 
alleged to have traded on or disclosed MNPI they learned 
through an employment relationship (47.9 percent). There is no 
dispute that misappropriation liability is appropriate in these 
situations because employees are agents who owe a fiduciary 
duty to the principal and have an obligation not to use the 
principal’s information for their benefit.357 Another 18.2 percent 
of cases are premised on a traditional fiduciary relationship 
 
 355. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569 (“We have little trouble finding the 
evidence insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship or its functional 
equivalent between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family.”). But see 
Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding the basis for liability on the alleged 
“disparate knowledge and expertise” of Kornman, placing no emphasis on 
discretionary authority or dependence). 
 356. See McGee, 763 F.3d at 310–16 (finding Rule 10b5-2 proper in both 
the SEC’s rulemaking authority and in supporting convictions for securities 
fraud and perjury).  
 357. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 231, at 105; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“[I]t is a breach of an agent’s duty to use 
confidential information of the principal for the purpose of effecting trades in 
securities . . . .”). 
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involving professionals such as lawyers,358 accountants,359 or 
investment bankers.360 Roughly two-thirds of misappropriation 




Alleged Duties in Misappropriation Cases 
Nature of Duty Civil Only Criminal Total 
Employment 32 (42.67) 26 (56.52) 58 (47.93) 
Other Traditional 
Fiduciary 
12 (16.00) 10 (21.74) 22 (18.18) 
Family Relationship 13 (17.33) 2 (04.35) 15 (12.40) 
Friendship 7 (09.33) 3 (06.52) 10 (08.26) 
Confidentiality Agreement 8 (10.67) 4 (08.70) 12 (09.92) 
Other 2 (02.67) 1 (02.17) 3 (02.48) 
Unknown 1 (01.33) 0 (00.00) 1 (00.83) 
Total 75 46 121 
Note: Number (percent) of fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence 
defendant violated in misappropriation cases as alleged in the complaint or 
other charging document. 
 
Cases based on family relationships, friendships, or 
breaches of confidentiality agreements are less frequent. Of 
these, family relationships are the most prevalent (involving 
17.3 percent of civil defendants) and the least problematic. To 
be sure, some early cases argued that not all close family 
relationships necessarily gave rise to a duty of trust and 
 
 358. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 4, SEC v. Grewal, No. 14-cv-02026 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 22, 2014), ECF No. 1 (stating that defendant was primary outside counsel 
that advised on matters of “corporate and securities law.”); Complaint ¶ 1, 
SEC v. Cutillo, No. 09-cv-09208 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009), ECF No. 1 (alleging 
that defendant, an attorney, “misappropriated from his law firm material, 
nonpublic information concerning at least four corporate acquisitions or bids”). 
 359. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 6, SEC v. London, No. 13-cv-02558 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 11, 2013), ECF No. 1 (involving a partner at a large accounting firm); 
Halpern, Exchange Act Release No. 71748, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1008 (Mar. 19, 
2014) (issuing a cease-and-desist order describing defendant as “a personal tax 
accountant”). 
 360. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, SEC v. Hixon, No. 14-cv-00158 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 20, 2014), ECF No. 2 (stating that the defendant had spent “at least the 
last 12 years of his career as an investment banker”). 
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confidence,361 but Rule 10b5-2 replaced the case-by-case 
analysis those decisions called for with a bright-line rule. While 
critics might disagree with how the SEC has drawn that line, if 
the primary complaint about the misappropriation theory is 
that it creates uncertain liability because duties of trust and 
confidence are poorly specified, then defining the precise 
relationships that give rise to liability should adequately 
address these concerns.362 The family cases enforcers bring tend 
to fit squarely within the confines of Rule 10b5-2.363  
Misappropriation cases premised on friendship can be more 
problematic. The SEC often couples allegations of friendship 
with allegations of a confidentiality agreement or with some 
evidence of a history, pattern, and practice of sharing 
confidences to try to fit the cases within the confines of Rule 
10b5-2. In some cases, these allegations are quite detailed,364 
but all too frequently the evidence is rather thin and the 
 
 361. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“[M]ore than the gratuitous reposal of a secret to another who happens to be 
a family member is required to establish a fiduciary or similar relationship of 
trust and confidence.”). 
 362. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden 
Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1039 (2009) 
(“[C]ontinuing uncertainty regarding the identity of the beneficiary of the 
requisite duty of trust and confidence for insider trading liability under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 further illustrates the unclear nature of that duty 
under existing doctrine.”). 
 363. See Complaint ¶ 11a, United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-cr-10131 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 3 (husband misappropriated MNPI from wife); 
Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Goetz, No. 11-cv-01220 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 2011), ECF 
No. 1 (father misappropriated MNPI from daughter); Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. 
Ni, No. 11-cv-0708 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1 (brother 
misappropriated MNPI from sister). But see Order Denying Defendant’s 
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at 2, SEC v. Jacobs, No. 13-cv-01289 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2014), ECF No. 112 (no liability following a conversation 
between brothers).  
 364. See Complaint ¶¶ 13–19, SEC v. Schvacho, No. 12-mi-99999 (N.D. 
Ga. July 24, 2012), ECF No. 1509 (providing a detailed account of the 
relationship between the insider and the accused); Complaint ¶¶ 56–63, SEC 
v. Scammell, No. 11-cv-06597(C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1 (involving 
a similar detailed account of allegations against defendant). 
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allegations conclusory.365 For example, in SEC v. Darden,366 the 
defendant allegedly misappropriated MNPI from a director 
regarding a company’s proposed merger.367 The SEC alleged 
that the two men “maintained regular contact over 30 years” 
and shared an office suite for six years.368 But the only allegation 
about an agreement was the conclusory statement that “they 
shared information, which information was expected to be and 
was maintained as confidential.”369 In some cases, there is 
virtually no factual detail regarding the relationship. In SEC v. 
Doyle,370 the only allegations were that the insider was the 
defendant’s house guest and inadvertently left deal documents 
there.371 That is hardly the stuff of a duty of trust and 
confidence, but those issues were never litigated.372 The case 
settled the day after it was filed, as did many of the friendship 
cases.  
Cases based solely on confidentiality agreements have been 
similarly controversial. Early decisions often held that “a 
fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a 
person with confidential information.”373 As noted, some 
commentators use these holdings to question the validity of Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1), which defines breach of such an agreement to be 
 
 365. See SEC v. Conradt, 947 F. Supp. 2d 406, 411–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(recognizing shortcomings of SEC’s allegations but finding them sufficient for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss). 
 366. No. 13-cv-00138 (N.D. Ga.).  
 367. Complaint ¶ 12, SEC v. Darden, No. 13-cv-00138 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 
2013), ECF No. 1. 
 368. Id. ¶ 13. 
 369. Id. ¶ 14; see Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Drewery, No. 14-cv-00299 
(E.D.N.C. May 27, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging that the men were “best friends” 
and had known each other for thirty-five years); Complaint ¶ 18, SEC v. 
McEnery, No. 15-cv-04091 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015), ECF No. 1 (involving a 
defendant and an insider that had “dated on and off since the early 1990s” and 
had a “history of sharing confidences”).  
 370. No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 371. Complaint ¶¶ 10–11, SEC v. Doyle, No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y. July 
19, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
 372. Agreed Final Judgment at 1, SEC v. Doyle, No. 11-cv-04964 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 21, 2011), ECF No. 4. 
 373. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(applying Delaware law). 
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sufficient for misappropriation liability.374 But many of the 
cases enforcers actually bring involve clear-cut situations in 
which the defendants violated explicit confidentiality 
agreements. Often these cases involve doctors supervising 
clinical trials375 or other kinds of consulting arrangements.376 In 
other cases, defendants were provided confidential offering 
information only after they agreed not to trade on it or tip it to 
anyone else.377 None of these cases involve overly aggressive 
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence. 
Taken together, there is some evidence the SEC 
expansively interprets duties of trust and confidence, 
particularly with respect to misappropriation among friends. 
While such cases constitute a small part of the civil enforcement 
actions, it would be particularly troubling if those same 
expansive and vague interpretations arose in the criminal 
context. Vague standards in criminal prosecutions could raise 
 
 374. See Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of Insider 
Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1487 (2010) (stating that Chestman 
remains the “most influential” case on the matter of duties required and that 
this reliance has engendered different responses to the validity of the Rule in 
courts). 
 375. See Boudreault, Securities Act Release No. 9864, Exchange Act 
Release No. 75420, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2881 (July 10, 2015) (describing 
defendant as a consultant for medical clinical trials); Amended Complaint ¶ 2, 
SEC v. CR Intrinsic Invs., LLC, No. 12-cv-08466 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013), 
ECF No. 25 (stating that Defendant Gilman “served as the chairman of the 
Safety Monitoring Committee (the “SMC”) overseeing the clinical trial”); 
Amended Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Benhamou, No. 10-cv-08266 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
13, 2011), ECF No. 3 (stating that Dr. Benhamou “was one of five members of 
a Steering Committee overseeing the clinical trial”). 
 376. See Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Condon, No. 15-cv-07443 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
23, 2015), ECF No. 1 (consultant retained to provide executive coaching 
services). 
 377. See Complaint ¶ 1, United States v. Fishoff, No. 15-mj-03622 (D.N.J. 
May 29, 2015), ECF No. 1 (stating that defendants “received inside 
information concerning a confidentially marketed secondary stock 
offering . . . pursuant to defendants’ entry into confidentiality or 
“wall-crossing” agreements” prohibiting disclosure or trading in the company’s 
securities). 
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significant due process concerns,378 and expansive applications 
of sparse statutory language would be inconsistent with the rule 
of lenity that normal applies to the interpretation of criminal 
statutes.379  
There is a little evidence, however, that expansive civil 
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence present a 
particular problem in criminal cases. Courts have often shown 
some sensitivity to expanding duties of trust and confidence in 
criminal cases even if they are willing to do so in civil ones.380 
The data suggest that criminal prosecutors consider these 
concerns. As Table 5 shows, criminal and civil enforcers bring 
similar proportions of misappropriation cases. Approximately a 
quarter of the defendants subject to criminal prosecution (24.9 
percent) were alleged to have misappropriated MNPI, compared 
to 27.1 percent in exclusively civil actions. Nontraditional duties 
of trust and confidence, however, appear with far greater 
frequency in civil cases. About 41 percent of civil cases involve a 
nontraditional duty of trust and confidence compared to just 
21.7 percent for criminal cases. These differences are significant 
at less than 5 percent.  
When criminal enforcement authorities pursue cases 
involving nontraditional fiduciary duties, they typically involve 
relatively egregious cases of insider trading, often involving 
close family members. These are the kinds of cases that tend not 
to test the boundaries of insider trading doctrine. For example, 
Matthew Devlin stole MNPI from his wife, an executive at a 
communications firm that provided services to companies 
engaged in M&A transactions.381 Devlin tipped the information 
to day traders, who referred to Devlin’s wife as the “Golden 
Goose” in text messages because of the valuable information she 
 
 378. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) (“[A] 
judicial holding that certain undefined activities ‘generally are prohibited’ by 
§ 10(b) would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants 
would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity.”). 
 379. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1005 (2014) (Scalia, J.). 
 380. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272 n.22 (11th Cir. 2003) (declining 
to narrowly circumscribe duties of trust and confidence in civil context).  
 381. United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
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possessed.382 But the court did not rest its finding of a duty of 
trust and confidence solely on the marriage relationship.383 
Instead, it held that the indictment could not be dismissed 
because it alleged “repeated disclosure of business secrets” and 
an agreement to maintain the confidentiality of those secrets 
sufficient to demonstrate “the functional equivalent of a 
fiduciary relationship.”384 Such allegations would be sufficient 
even under the most restrictive interpretations of the 
misappropriation theory. 
Criminal cases based on friendship tend not to be based 
solely on the existence of the relationship itself. Rather, they 
typically involve strong evidence of an agreement to maintain 
information in confidence, thus fitting easily within the confines 
of Rule 10b5-2. For example, in United States v. McPhail,385 the 
defendant was close friends with an executive of a publicly 
traded company.386 The executive disclosed MNPI in confidence 
to McPhail, warning him that he should never repeat anything 
they discussed.387 Nonetheless, McPhail tipped the MNPI to 
other friends.388 Evidence in the case showed both that McPhail 
knew that he should maintain the confidentiality of the MNPI 
and that passing it on was wrongful.389  
Taken together, these data suggest that civil enforcers 
define duties of trust and confidence more expansively than 
criminal enforcers. Criminal enforcement does sometimes 
involve nontraditional fiduciary duties, but usually in cases 
involving close family relationships or situations in which there 
is a clear agreement to maintain the confidentiality of 
 
 382. See id. at 610 (stating that Devlin’s wife was referred to as the 
“Golden Goose” because she was “able to produce precious information about 
publicly-traded companies prior to its public announcement”).  
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. at 616–17 (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 
(2d Cir. 1991)). 
 385. 831 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016).  
 386. Id. at 3. 
 387. Id. at 5. 
 388. Id.  
 389. Id. at 6–7. 
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information.390 As a result, fears that expansive civil 
interpretations of duties of trust and confidence are 
inappropriately broadening the scope of criminal liability 
appear not be borne out by actual prosecutorial practices. 
VII.     The Targets of Insider Trading Enforcement 
To more fully understand how enforcement rhetoric 
matches up with enforcement reality, this section provides 
detailed data on which cases enforcers bring against which 
defendants and how those cases are resolved. By looking at how 
enforcers operationalize insider trading law, we can better 
evaluate which of the competing depictions of enforcement is the 
most accurate. The available evidence strongly suggests that 
the SEC targets enforcement efforts at cases that are likely to 
be quickly and easily resolved. Criminal enforcement, by 
contrast, is generally reserved for more serious cases, measured 
by, among other things, the type of defendant, the size of the 
insider trading network, and the profits earned. But like civil 
cases, the criminal cases tend to be those in which liability is 
fairly certain. 
A.  Civil Outcomes 
Perhaps the best evidence that the SEC focuses its 
enforcement efforts on cases that are likely to be quickly and 
easily resolved are the actual enforcement outcomes. As shown 
in Table 6, the sample contains 405 actions the SEC filed in 
federal court that were resolved when the sample was analyzed. 
The SEC won 93.1 percent of those cases. Win rates like these 
are not uncommon in governmental enforcement proceedings, 
and they are driven in large part by high settlement rates. More 
than 90 percent of the resolved cases in the dataset were settled. 
Twenty-three cases were resolved in defendants’ favor through 
some form of pre-trial resolution. The SEC won only nine (64.3 




 390. See id. at 5 (“[T]he evidence that he [McPhail] knew that Santamaria 
was expecting him to keep the inside information secret is quite strong.”). 
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Table 6 
Outcomes in Resolved SEC Federal Court Actions 
 Number  (% Total) 
Government  377 (93.09) 
Settlement 368 (90.86) 
Civil Trial 9 (2.22) 
Defendant 28 (6.91) 
Dismissal 23 (5.68) 
Civil Trial 5 (1.23) 
Total 405  
Note: Included all SEC civil actions in federal court that 
were resolved when the sample was analyzed. 
 
More telling than the number of cases that settle, however, 
is the speed with which cases are resolved. The SEC’s actions 
are typically stayed if there is a parallel criminal action, 
substantially lengthening the time to resolve the case.391 As 
shown in Table 1, on average, the 158 civil cases with parallel 
criminal actions took 625 days to resolve, significantly longer 
than the 251 days to resolve the remaining 247 civil 
enforcement actions.392 But most civil actions are resolved much 
more quickly. As shown in Table 7, a total of 121 cases (49.0 
percent) settled within thirty days or fewer of filing. Although 
the SEC takes a long time to bring cases, once it does, they wrap 
up quickly.393 The shorter the case the better the outcome for 
the SEC. The agency obtained a settlement in 100 percent of the 
cases resolved in 180 days or fewer; it prevailed in just 81.6 









 391. See Velikonja, supra note 341, at 423. 
 392. See infra Table 1. This difference is significant at less than 0.001. 
 393. See supra Part VII.G. 
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Table 7 
Days from Filing to Resolution in SEC Civil 
Enforcement Actions 
 Number (% Total) 
30 Days or Fewer 121 (48.99) 
31-364 Days 65 (26.32) 
1-2 Years 36 (14.57) 
More than 2 Years 25 (10.12) 
Total 247  
Note: Cases include only civil actions brought in federal court without 
parallel criminal actions. 
 
In terms of time to resolution, the SEC obtains significant 
advantages from relying on FINRA referrals. The cases in the 
dataset with FINRA referrals were resolved in an average of 
just 150 days. That was significantly less time than in the cases 
without FINRA referrals, which took more than twice as long 
(394 days) on average.394 These data are consistent with the idea 
that the FINRA referrals the SEC files are more certain, easier 
cases. 
B.  Targeted Defendants 
The common trope in insider trading rhetoric is the director 
or high-level executive of a large, often well-known company, 
either trading on or tipping information. Such cases, however, 
are relatively uncommon (Table 8). Overall, just 10.3 percent of 
insider trading defendants were senior officers or directors. For 
cases enforced only through civil actions, officer and directors 
accounted for 12.8 percent of defendants. In most instances, 
these individuals were from smaller firms, where looser controls 
and less institutional ownership may make insider trading 
easier.395 For example, Anthony Andrade was an outside 
 
 394. See supra Table 7. This difference is significant at less than 0.001. 
 395. Larger firms typically have more institutional ownership and 
stronger governance controls. Insider trading appears to be more difficult and 
enforcement less prevalent in these settings. See Lauren Cohen et al., 
Decoding Inside Information, 67 J. FIN. 1009, 1020 (2012) (stating that the 
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director of a community bank who tipped three friends about the 
bank’s impending acquisition.396 Frank Blystone was the 
chairman of the board and CEO of an oil and gas company who 




Types of Defendants 
 Overall Criminal Non-Criminal 
Officer and Director 48 (10.32) 12 ( 6.52) 36 (12.81) 
Other Employee 71 (15.27) 30 (16.30) 41 (14.59) 
SMP 100 (21.51) 68 (36.96) 32 (11.39) 
Lawyer 13 (2.80) 8 (4.35) 5 (1.78) 
Other Professional 30 (6.45) 10 (5.43) 20 (7.12) 
Friends and Family 177 (38.06) 52 (28.11) 125 (44.64) 
Other 26 (5.59) 5 (2.72) 21 (7.47) 
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Percentages may 
not add to 100 due to rounding. In some cases, data was unavailable for all 
defendants. As a result, the number of observations for some variables differs. 
 
The more common defendants are mid-level company 
employees. Insider trading is thus less a violation of “the most 
advantaged, privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern 
finance,”398 and more one targeting middle managers. Overall, 
about 15 percent of insider trading defendants are nonexecutive 
officers employed by the corporate source.399 It is also not 
 
number of insider buys is higher for smaller firms); Lee et al., supra note 315, 
at 167 (noting that probabilities of information-based trading are lower for 
large firms than for smaller firms). 
 396. SEC Charges Director of Rhode Island Bank and Three Others With 
Insider Trading, Litigation Release No. 23278, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2271 (June 
8, 2015). 
 397. SEC Charges Former Oil Company Executive With Insider Trading, 
Litigation Release No. 22367, 2012 SEC LEXIS 1488 (May 11, 2012). 
 398. Bharara, supra note 14.  
 399. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Fan, No. 11-cv-00096 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 1 (manager of clinical programming). 
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uncommon for lower level employees to face insider trading 
charges.400  
The biggest differences between the subsamples of civil and 
criminal targets lie in two categories of defendants, SMPs and 
an amorphous group of “friends and family” who are often the 
recipients of improper tips. Case law, the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, enforcement rhetoric, and the narrative conventions 
of insider trading typically portray insider trading by SMPs as 
more blameworthy than other kinds of improper trading. In that 
light and given that so much of the recent criminal crackdown 
targeted insider trading at hedge funds, it cannot be very 
surprising that SMPs appear three times more frequently in the 
sampled cases with criminal components. But those differences 
were not just byproducts of the crackdown. Even toward the end 
of the study period, when the crackdown had begun to taper off, 
SMPs appeared more frequently in criminal matters.401 Of 
course, these defendants are not just the elite market 
participants of insider trading rhetoric. Prosecutors often target 
lower level employees from hedge funds and investment banks 
to obtain their cooperation.402  
By contrast, the SEC cases are dominated by opportunistic 
tips passed to friends and family members. As Table 8 shows, 
44.64 percent of the civil enforcement cases involved friends or 
family members trading on tips, often from mid-level corporate 
insiders. A typical example involved a marketing director who 
traded and then tipped his father-in-law when he learned that 
his company was about to be acquired.403 The significance of 
these kinds of tippees in the SEC’s enforcement program 
highlights the importance of the Supreme Court’s recent 
 
 400. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. Vance, No. 13-cv-00172 (D. Or. Jan. 
30, 2013), ECF No. 1 (IT employee). 
 401. For FY 2014–2015, 30.43 percent of defendants in cases with criminal 
enforcement were SMPs compared to just 6.60 percent of cases without a 
criminal component.  
 402. See, e.g., Information ¶ 1, United States v. Cardillo, No. 11-cr-00078 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 4 (trader). 
 403. See SEC Files Settled Insider Trading Action against Pharmaceutical 
Company Executive and His Father-In-Law, Litigation Release No. 22474, 
2012 SEC LEXIS 2827 (Sept. 6, 2012). 
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Salman404 decision, which re-affirmed that a gift of inside 
information to a relative or friend could provide a basis for 
liability under Rule 10b-5.405 
C.  Insider Trading Activity 
Insider trading can involve a range of conduct. The most 
serious cases involve complex networks of individuals who trade 
tips or SMPs who cultivate a wide array of sources at companies 
or expert network firms. In popular depictions, savvy market 
operators receive inside information from multiple, often 
unrelated sources, using their financial resources to earn 
enormous profits.406 To maximize returns, more sophisticated 
traders employ options or other derivative instruments rather 
than common shares. They take elaborate steps to disguise their 
trading, such as conducting it through offshore accounts,407 or 
using disposable cell phones408 or communicating in code.409 If 
an investigation is launched, they may lie to investigators, 
destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct justice.410 These factors 
are generally reflected in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as 
markers of more serious crimes warranting longer sentences.411 
 
 404. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).  
 405. Id. at 429. 
 406. See supra Part II.A. 
 407. See Affidavit of Special Agent Ryan Lane in Support of an Application 
for Criminal Complaint at 3–6, United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-cr-10131 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 3-1 (identifying three different brokerage 
accounts used in insider trading scheme). 
 408. See Complaint ¶¶ 23–27, 32–34, United States v. Jorgenson, No. 
14-cr-00120 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2013), ECF No. 1 (noting trading tactics). 
 409. See Sealed Complaint ¶ 14, United States v. Zwerko, No. 14-cr-00715 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014), ECF No. 1 (explaining how traders operated their 
scheme).  
 410. See Information ¶¶ 4–6, United States v. Freeman, No. 11-cr-00116 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 1 (witness tampering); Indictment ¶¶ 9–11, 
United States v. Jiau, No. 11-cr-00161 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011), ECF No. 9. 
 411. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.3, 3C1.1 (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (providing adjustments to the offense level based on the 
defendant’s role in committing the offense such as aggravating role, abuse of 
position of trust, use of special skill, and obstructing and impeding the 
administration of justice). 
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But insider trading can also be a far simpler affair. A 
company employee may learn of an impending transaction and 
make a rash decision to buy shares.412 He (or occasionally she)413 
may tip the information to a friend, who may earn a small 
profit.414 In a rational insider trading enforcement system, 
larger and more sophisticated schemes should be more likely to 
be subject criminal enforcement than smaller, less sophisticated 
one-off transactions.  
The evidence suggests that enforcers reliably draw these 
distinctions. Civil insider trading cases typically involve a single 
incident of insider trading as opposed to systematic attempts to 
obtain and deploy MNPI. As shown in Table 9, nearly 80 percent 
of civil enforcement actions involve a single insider trading 
episode, with mean (median) events of 2.6 (1).415 By contrast, the 
mean for criminal cases is 5.1, with a median of 3. While the 
differences between civil and criminal enforcement actions are 
significant, it is important to observe that the alleged activity 
may not be the best measure of the actual number of insider 
trading incidents. Proof problems or strategic litigation 
decisions may cause enforcers to allege fewer incidents than the 
number for which they have some evidence. Charging practices 
might also understate the differences between civil and criminal 
cases. Prosecutors may, for example, lodge fewer charges 
against cooperating witnesses in order to affect sentencing 
calculations. Still, the available evidence suggests purely civil 
cases general involve less serious violations. Overall, 79.7 
 
 412. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–12, SEC v. Pupynin, No. 14-cv-07482 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014), ECF No. 1 (alleging that an IT employee at a law 
firm illegally purchased stock and stock options in companies that the law firm 
represented prior to their impending deal announcements). 
 413. Insider trading defendants are overwhelmingly (95 percent) men. See 
supra Table 1 (showing that male defendants constitute 93.2 percent of civil 
enforcement cases and 97.3 percent of criminal enforcement cases). 
 414. See, e.g., Bolan, Exchange Act Release No. 73244, 2014 SEC LEXIS 
5115 (Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that a Wells Fargo employee leaked material 
nonpublic information to a trusted friend and a former colleague). 
 415. The mean in civil enforcement actions is skewed by a single case in 
which employees of a credit card processing company were alleged to have 
used MNPI to trade on 140 separate occasions. See Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, SEC v. 
Huang, No. 15-cv-00269 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2015), ECF No. 1. Without that 
case, the mean for civil cases would be 1.6. 
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percent of civil cases with a single insider trading event involved 
MNPI about an impending M&A transaction, the quintessential 
one-off, opportunistic trade. 
 
Table 9 
Alleged Insider Trading Activity 
Panel A    
 Mean Median SD 
IT Events ** 3.59 1.00 10.27 
Criminal 5.11 3.00 6.94 
Noncriminal 2.59 1.00 11.86 
Network Size *** 5.32 4.00 4.48 
Criminal 7.46 5.00 5.34 
Noncriminal 3.93 3.00 3.11 
Panel B    
 Count Percentage by 
Case Type 
 
Security***    
Common Shares Only    
Criminal 64 34.59%  
Noncriminal 169 60.36%  
Options/Other Derivatives    
Criminal 26 14.05%  
Noncriminal 35 12.50%  
No Trading    
Criminal 54 29.19%  
Noncriminal 34 12.14%  
Common Shares & Options    
Criminal 41 22.16%  
Noncriminal 42 15.00%  
Concealment/Obstruction***    
Criminal 70 63.06%  
Noncriminal 41 36.94%  
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001 
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. 
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In cases without criminal enforcement, the mean (median) 
size of the insider trading network was 3.92 (3) individuals. In 
criminal cases, by contrast, the mean (median) network 
contained 7.5 (5) traders. In other words, the insider trading 
that is subject to civil enforcement typically involves a small 
group of often closely linked individuals. For a standard 
scenario, consider the case of Loretta Itri, an executive of Genta, 
Inc., a now bankrupt biopharmaceutical company.416 In October 
2009, Genta announced that its Phase 3 trial for a melanoma 
drug in development had not shown any statistically significant 
benefit.417 Given Genta’s size and its reliance on the drug, the 
company’s stock price dropped 70 percent after the 
announcement.418 A day before, Dr. Itri disclosed the results to 
her friend and medical school classmate who in turn tipped his 
patient.419 As is typical for civil cases, Dr. Itri learned one piece 
of MNPI.420 There was no scheme to traffic in multiple pieces of 
MNPI. 
One proxy for sophistication is the type of security traded. 
The least sophisticated traders employing MNPI are most likely 
to trade common shares, even though options or other 
derivatives might yield greater returns. Enforcement actions 
against such traders are significantly more likely to be civil 
rather than criminal. As Table 9 shows, more than 60 percent 
of defendants in civil cases traded only common stock, compared 
to just 35 percent of criminal defendants. With larger, more 
complex networks, criminal defendants are more likely to be 
either tippers or SMPs, who trade not for their own accounts but 
for the accounts of their firm or their clients. 
A final significant difference between criminal and civil 
enforcement is the frequency of allegations that the defendants 
took steps to conceal their activity or obstruct the investigation. 
Table 9 shows that these allegations are made against a 
 
 416. See Complaint at 3, SEC v. Itri, No. 14-cv-02525 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 
2014), ECF No. 1. 
 417. See id. at 4–5. 
 418. See id. at 5. 
 419. Dr. Moskowitz allegedly advised three other unspecified individuals 
to sell Genta stock after learning MNPI from Dr. Itri. The SEC did not pursue 
claims against those individuals. Id. at 8–9. 
 420. See id. at 8. 
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significantly higher percentage of criminal defendants (63.1 
percent) than civil ones (36.9 percent). Typical examples include 
trading through unrelated or offshore accounts, using 
disposable cell phones, communicating in code language, and 
lying to investigators or destroying documents.421 Facts like 
these are important in criminal cases, where the government is 
required to prove that the defendant acted willfully.422 Courts 
generally require the defendant’s awareness that she was 
engaged in a wrongful or unlawful act.423 Elaborate efforts to 
avoid detection provide circumstantial evidence of willfulness. 
Likewise, actions to cover-up wrongdoing in the face of an 
investigation may be admissible as evidence of the defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt, further bolstering the government’s 
case.424  
D.  Tippers, Tippees, and Remote Tippees 
The most rudimentary insider trading cases involve a single 
individual who learns MNPI and trades on it. An only slightly 
more complicated case involves an individual who learns MNPI 
and, rather than or in addition to trading, passes it on to another 
who trades. If the original source was Level 0, the immediate 
tippee is Level 1. Level 1 defendants might also be thought to 
include individuals who misappropriate information from a 
source to whom they owe a duty. 
 
 421. See cases cited supra notes 407–410. 
 422. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 
2007–08 (2006) (explaining that the Supreme Court has generally required 
proof of willfulness in cases alleging white collar crimes). 
 423. See United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that willfulness only requires an awareness of the general 
wrongfulness, not unlawfulness, of conduct); United States v. Cassese, 428 
F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining willfulness as “a realization on the 
defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act” (quoting United States v. 
Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970))). 
 424. See United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 761 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that spoilation of evidence is relevant to consciousness of guilt); 
United States v. Martoma, No. 12-cr-00973, 2014 WL 31700, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 6, 2014) (“Evidence of a party’s consciousness of guilt may be relevant if 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from it and if the evidence is probative of 
guilt.” (quoting United States v. Perez. 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir.2004))). 
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From those simple cases, it is easy to increase the 
complexity. There could be multiple Level 0 sources or multiple 
Level 1 tippees, all of whom learned the MNPI from the same 
source. Any of the Level 1 tippees could pass the MNPI to a 
Level 2 tippee, and any of those could pass it to a Level 3 tippee 
and so on. Generally speaking, any tippee who receives the 
information from another tippee is defined as a remote tippee.425 
Theoretically, the chain could continue indefinitely. 
Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court’s Dirks v. SEC426 
decision governed tipper-tippee liability. It requires that the 
tipper receives a direct or indirect personal benefit for the tip.427 
For much of that time, proving benefit was not difficult, with 
courts often accepting that rather tenuous benefits satisfied the 
Dirks standard.428 Indeed, the standard was so weak that in 
many cases in the dataset there was no alleged benefit.429 In 
2014, however, the Second Circuit decided United States v. 
Newman,430 a case involving Level 3 and 4 tippees.431 There, the 
court tightened the benefit requirement. Inferring a benefit 
from a gift of insider information, the court held, was only 
permissible if the government could prove “a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain 
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”432 
Newman spawned a cottage industry of commentary, with 
various takes on the correctness of the decision and its potential 
 
 425. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426 (2016) (defining a 
remote tippee as a “tippee[] who receive[s] inside information from another 
tippee, rather than the tipper”). 
 426. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 427. See id. at 663–64 (stating that the initial inquiry is “whether the 
insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure”).  
 428. See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating 
that personal benefit included free meals, jars of honey, and live lobsters). 
 429. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1–4, SEC v. Amin, No. 12-cv-03960 (C.D. Cal. 
May 7, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
 430. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), overruled in part by Salman v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 431. See id. at 443 (“Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed 
from the corporate insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware 
of the source of the inside information.”).  
 432. Id. 
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impact on enforcers.433 Some thought the decision was 
appropriate because enforcers pursued overly aggressive 
actions against individuals far removed from the source of the 
information.434 In 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Dirks’ 
gift test.435 The Second Circuit continued to debate what if 
anything remained of the stricter scrutiny Newman signaled.436 
The concern exhibited about remote tippees, however, is 
wildly out of proportion to their actual significance in insider 
trading enforcement actions. As shown in Table 10, a little over 
71 percent of defendants are Level 0 or 1, that is, individuals 
who were either the original source of the MPNI or learned of it 
directly from that source. In other words, seven out of ten 
defendants are not remote tippees. When remote tippees do 
appear in enforcement cases, they are typically not far removed 
from the original source. Over 72 percent of remote tippees are 
Level 2 tippees, individuals who are only one step removed from 
the original source of the information. Indeed, more than 92 
percent of defendants are Level 2 or closer. In the sample, there 








 433. See Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 569–70 (2017) (concluding that the personal benefit test 
is no longer useful and necessary to find tipper-tippee liability); see generally 
Nagy, supra note 115, at 28–29 (discussing the implications of the Salman 
case). 
 434. See Macey, supra note 30, at 68–69 (stating that Newman recognized 
the valid reasons why corporate insiders would disclose MNPI to capital 
market participants in advance of its general release to the public). 
 435. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) 
(reaffirming Dirks’ test that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a 
gift of confidential information to “a trading relative”). 
 436. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“Salman fundamentally altered the analysis underlying Newman’s 
‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement such that the 
‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ requirement is no longer good 
law.”), vacated on other grounds, No. 14-3599, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 37437 
(2d Cir. June 25, 2018). 
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Table 10 
Insider Trading Defendant Levels 
Level Overall Pre-Newman Post-Newman 
0 151 (32.47) 137 (33.83) 14 (23.33) 
1 181 (38.92) 154 (38.02) 27 (45.00) 
2 96 (20.65) 77 (19.01) 19 (31.67) 
3 24 (5.16) 24 (5.03) 0 (0.00) 
4 12 (2.58) 12 (2.96) 0 (0.00) 
5 1 (0.22) 1 (0.25) 0 (0.00) 
Total 465  405  60  
  
 These results are consistent with the view that enforcers 
tend to pursue relatively routine cases where the likelihood of 
liability is higher. Even before Newman, the farther the 
defendant was from the source of the information, the harder it 
was for enforcers to show the elements for tipper-tippee liability. 
But even more importantly, these results demonstrate that 
enforcers are responsive to judicial efforts to rein in what they 
perceive to be aggressive enforcement efforts. Before Newman, 
cases against tippees who were Level 3 or greater were rare, 
occurring in just 9.1 percent of cases. After Newman, civil or 
criminal enforcement authorities did not file a single action 
against such a defendant. After Newman, the only cases in the 
dataset that civil and criminal enforcement authorities brought 
against remote tippees were against Level 2 traders. 
Given the anecdotal evidence regarding enforcers’ risk 
aversion, it seems reasonable to attribute the relative paucity of 
cases against remote tippees to their reluctance to bring risky 
cases. In civil cases in the dataset involving Level 0–2 
defendants, the SEC prevailed in 93.5 percent of the cases. 
When it pursued actions against Level 3–5 defendants, its win 
rate dropped to 83.8 percent, a difference that is significant at 
less than 5 percent. The same is true in criminal cases. 
Prosecutors obtained convictions or pleas in over 90 percent of 
the cases they brought against Level 0 or 1 defendants. Those 
rates dropped to 79.0 percent for Level 2 defendants, 64.7 
percent for Level 3 defendants, and 28.6 percent for Level 4 
defendants.437 In other words, Newman appears to have 
 
 437. Prosecutors did not charge any defendants beyond Level 4. 
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reinforced the already strong incentives not to pursue cases 
against remote tippees. These data, in other words, provide 
strong evidence for the law-making partnership model that 
Professors Fisch and Nagy have articulated.438  
E.  Insider Trading Profits 
As Table 11 shows, on average criminal cases involve more 
profitable insider trading episodes than civil ones. There are no 
significant differences in the traders’ direct profits between 
these subsets. But with the larger networks and increased 
presence of SMPs in criminal cases, the downstream 
profits— defined as the sum of profits earned by all individuals 
who traded on the information as a result of a direct or indirect 
tip from the defendant—are significantly larger. Downstream 
tippees in criminal cases have mean profits of around $7.05 
million, compared to $1.55 million in civil cases.  
 
Table 11 
Alleged Profits in Insider Trading Enforcement 
Actions 
 Mean Median SD 
Direct Profits  992.68 58.87 7,365.75 
Criminal 817.97 130.75 2,749.51 
Noncriminal 1,105.62 46.73 9,194.64 
Downstream Profits *** 3,689.65 5.55 20,434.800 
Criminal 7,046.95 642.98 24,318.00 
Noncriminal 1,555.37 0.00 17,235.00 
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001 
Source: SEC Litigation Releases and filed case documents. Profits are in 
constant 2016 dollars reported in thousands. 
 
What is even more notable than the disparities between 
civil and criminal cases are how skewed the data on insider 
trading profits are. The average direct profit for the sample is 
$992,680, but the median profit is only $58,870. In part, this is 
 
 438. See supra Part II.B. 
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due to the presence of a significant number of tippers, who often 
have no alleged trading profits. But it is also the case that most 
defendants earn comparatively small profits while a handful of 
traders earn substantial ones. The interquartile range for direct 
profits is $11,586 to $261,821. By contrast, the 99th percentile 
is $16.6 million. Or, to put it another way, the total direct profit 
of all insider trading defendants in the sample was $457.6 
million. A subset of just five traders (about 1 percent of the 
sample) had direct profits totaling $255.7 million, or 55.9 
percent of the total. 
Although not as skewed as direct profits, the same general 
pattern applies to downstream profits. Indeed, the median 
downstream profit in civil cases is $0, further supporting the 
hypothesis that civil cases tend to involve one-off claims against 
individuals rather than systematic schemes involving networks 
of traders. Overall, the interquartile range for downstream 
profits is $0 to $656,826. The 99th percentile is one-hundred 
times larger at $65.6 million. 
It is the cases with small direct and downstream profits 
that dominate the civil cases settled within thirty days of filing. 
Recall that nearly half of the SEC’s cases settle within that 
short timeframe.439 Given the small amounts at stake in these 
cases and the high costs of litigation, it seems reasonable to 
assume that enforcement officials can anticipate that 
defendants will be willing to settle them expeditiously. The 
mean (median) direct profits for defendants in those cases is 
$118,505 ($37,657). The median defendant in these cases was a 
solitary trader who did not tip and who therefore generated no 
downstream profits. In short, the SEC’s insider trading 
enforcement docket is dominated by defendants who earned 
small profits from their own trading and who settle quickly.  
F.  Are Criminal Cases Different? 
Are criminal prosecutions reserved for more serious cases 
of insider trading, as the foregoing univariate data suggest? 
Table 12 reports the results of a logistic regression with criminal 
enforcement as the dependent variable. The results show 
 
 439. See supra Table 7. 
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significant differences between civil and criminal cases, which 
suggest that criminal actions are generally reserved for more 
serious insider trading episodes. All else being equal, 
defendants who participate in larger networks and obtain larger 
direct and downstream profits have significantly greater odds of 
being criminally prosecuted. The significant result for Level 
reflects the same association between complex trading networks 
and the likelihood of criminal prosecution. Facts suggesting 
knowingly wrongful conduct also increase the likelihood of 
criminal prosecution. The odds that defendants who are alleged 
to have engaged in attempts to conceal their activities or 
obstruct an investigation will face criminal prosecution are 
about four times higher than those without such allegations. 
More sophisticated defendants (as measured by the kinds of 
securities traded) face higher odds of criminal prosecution as 
well.  
The regression results only partially support the rhetoric 
that criminal prosecutions target the “most advantaged, 
privileged, and wealthy insiders in modern finance.”440 This is 
certainly true of SMPs, whose odds of facing criminal 
prosecution are over four times greater than the reference 
category of miscellaneous defendants. There is similarly some 
evidence that criminal enforcement authorities target 
substantial fiduciary breaches. Lawyers alleged to have 
engaged in insider trading are six times more likely than other 
defendants to face criminal prosecution, although that 
correlation is only significant at 10 percent. But there is no 
statistically significant relationship between criminal 
prosecution and being a director or officer, a result that may be 










 440. Bharara, supra note 14. 
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Table 12 







Network Size  1.184 (.046)*** 1.097 1.277 
IT Events 1.014 (.011) 0.993 1.204 
Level 1.519 (.282)* 1.055 2.186 
Defendant Type     
Officer/Director 2.111 (1.574) 0.490 9.099 
Other Employee 2.181 (1.603) 0.516 9.211 
SMP 4.589 (2.821)** 1.375 15.311 
Lawyer 5.928 (6.572) 0.765 52.067 
Other Professional 1.013 (0.793) 0.219 4.697 
Friends & Family 1.545 (0.874) 0.510 4.679 
MNPI     
Financial 1.586 (0.997) 0.462 5.437 
M&A Activity 1.550 (0.873) 0.514 4.676 
Product Approval 1.996 (1.534) 0.440 9.052 
Security     
Options/Derivatives 2.480 (0.966)* 1.156 5.319 
No Trading 2.918 (1.364)* 1.167 7.293 
Common Shares & Options 2.904 (1.123)** 1.361 6.195 
     
Log Direct Profit 1.101 (0.040)** 1.026 1.182 
Log Downstream Profit 1.154 (0.027)*** 1.102 1.209 
Concealment/Obstruction 4.485 (1.294)*** 2.439 8.246 
Gender 0.294 (0.230) 0.635 1.365 
Constant 0.003 (0.003)*** 0.000 0.019 
Observations 457    
Wald χ2 126.54    
Prob > χ2 0.000    
Pseudo r2 0.360    
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001 
 
While it is certainly possible to question the resources the 
SEC devotes to small insider trading matters and whether that 
allocation makes sense in light of the agency’s deterrence and 
other goals, the evidence at least suggests a reasonable 
allocation between civil and criminal cases. The SEC focuses its 
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efforts on smaller, often opportunistic cases where there seems 
little risk that the defendants will have the opportunity to 
engage in future violations. After all, how many times will a 
middle manager learn that his company is about to be acquired? 
If enforcers make the decision to pursue such cases, civil, rather 
than criminal, enforcement seems entirely appropriate.  
This analysis also suggests that market participants have 
relatively clear notice of the activities that will lead to criminal 
enforcement. Criminal enforcement is more likely to target 
more systematic and sophisticated insider trading episodes and 
those where the profits were higher. Consistent with 
enforcement rhetoric, SMPs should be aware that they face a 
much higher likelihood of prosecution than other market 
participants.  
G. The SEC and Low Hanging Fruit 
A good deal of the univariate data reported in this section 
suggests that the SEC pursues relatively straightforward cases 
that it believes will be resolved quickly and easily. The SEC 
cases are dominated by isolated instances of opportunistic 
trading. They often involve mid-level employees or their friends 
and family, come from referrals from FINRA, and have 
relatively small profits. But for SEC attorneys to target 
incidents they think will be resolved without much litigation 
effort requires that they have the ability to identify observable 
case characteristics associated with quick settlements. Are 
there pre-filing case characteristics that are correlated with the 
length of litigation? 
To analyze that question, I ran linear regressions with Civil 
Case Length (the time in days from the date the SEC files the 
complaint until the final judgment is entered) as the dependent 
variable. The only variables included in the analysis (with one 
exception) are those SEC enforcers could observe prior to case 
filing. The exception is whether there is a criminal enforcement 
action involving the same defendant, which may not be filed 
until after the SEC action. Criminal cases, however, almost 
invariably result in the stay of civil proceedings, making 
criminal enforcement a necessary control variable. The results 
appear in Table 13. 
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There are two main results for Model 1. First, Civil Case 
Length is positively correlated with the total profits the 
defendants in the insider trading network earned. Not 
surprisingly, the larger the profits the longer the case takes to 
resolve, all else being equal. Second, cases with FINRA referrals 
settle much more quickly. On average, a case with a FINRA 
referral is resolved 153 days faster (about five months) than 
cases without such referrals. That means SEC enforcement 
attorneys can reliably predict that the small cases they get from 
FINRA will be resolved quickly, with minimal post-filing effort 
and with little risk of loss.  
But the ease with which the SEC can expect to settle a case 
will likely depend not just on these isolated factors, but on a 
combination of case characteristics. To test this theory, Model 2 
contains interaction terms for two key variables—the type of 
security the defendant traded and the nature of the MNPI. In 
Model 2, both Total Profit and FINRA remain significant and 
with the same sign as Model 1. But Model 2 also contains 
evidence that the SEC has the ability to identify case 
characteristics that are correlated with speed of resolution. 
Cases that feature common share trading before M&A activity 
settle significantly more quickly than other cases. The same is 
true of cases involving defendants who trade either common 
shares or a combination of shares and options before product 
approval announcements.  
 
Table 13 
Linear Regression Civil Case Length 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE 
Log Total Profit 39.781 (14.367)** 39.184 (14.364)** 
Defendant Type     
Officer/Director 138.479 (117.781) 128.741 (122.537) 
Other Employee -24.859 (104.257) -46.040 (104.549) 
SMP 107.820 (97.580) 79.531 (100.470) 
Lawyer -9.472 (149.013) -47.190 (155.277) 
Other Professional -96.642 (99.254) -111.978 (101.113) 
Friends & Family 93.365 (89.476) 84.685 (93.0523) 
     
Criminal Enforcement 234.955 (74.814)** 254.608 (74.875)*** 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE 
FINRA -152.675 (56.128)** -149.393 (56.152)** 
ORSA 94.587 (56.020) 91.596 (56.275) 
FBI 77.328 (60.654) 59.334 (63.491) 
IT Events -1.957 (1.247) -1.517 (1.353) 
Network Size  -4.892 (6.199) -1.164 (6.351) 
Level -1.968 (30.201) -4.548 (30.379) 
Concealment/Obstruction 27.766 (54.204) 33.195 (55.046) 
Security     
Common Shares 46.888 (69.786) 537.340 (212.290)* 
Options/Derivatives 121.326 (99.059) 355.951 (318.866) 
Common Shares & Options 88.942 (81.395) 223.577 (147.003) 
MNPI     
Financial -155.188 (133.477) 117.693 (114.575) 
M&A Activity -182.358 (121.586) 277.061 (122.671)* 
Product Approval -191.357 (157.201) 248.662 (190.556) 
Interaction Terms     
Financial x Common Shares   -365.929 (235.156) 
Financial x 
Options/Derivative 
  -127.147 (350.019) 
Financial x Common Shares 
& Options 
  114.362 (176.046) 
M&A x Common Shares   -566.695 (207.147)** 
M&A x Options/Derivative   -315.768 (331.801) 
M&A x Common Shares & 
Options  
  -222.253 (168.796) 
Product Approval x Common 
Shares 
  -571.942 (279.855)* 
Product Approval x 
Options/Derivative 
  0.000 (omitted) 
Product Approval x Common 
Shares & Options  
  -448.489 (224.441)* 
     
Constant -95.440 (219.761) 0.000 0.019 
Observations 403  403  
r2 0.259  0.276  
Significance: * = 0.05 ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001 
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As discussed in Part V, these cases tend to involve 
indisputable MNPI. M&A cases dominate the SEC docket.441 
These factors, along with the fact that the SEC tends to pursue 
cases with comparatively small profits involving trading 
exclusively in common shares,442 typically by lower level 
employees and their friends and families,443 all support the 
same hypothesis. Not only does the SEC have the ability to 
identify obvious cases of insider trading that are likely to settle 
quickly, but these cases dominate the SEC’s docket. To be sure, 
the reasons that shape SEC case selection remain uncertain. 
This pattern of cases could just as easily support an inference of 
an administrative agency looking to pad its enforcement 
statistics or conserve scarce trial resources as it could loss 
averse enforcement personnel making overly conservative case 
choices. Perhaps all of these factors are at work. But the bottom 
line remains the same—civil insider trading enforcement 
focuses predominantly on the lowest hanging fruit. 
VIII.     Conclusion 
There is a large gap in the debate on insider trading 
enforcement. The enforcement rhetoric focuses on policing 
market fairness by targeting SMPs and other elite market 
participants. Academic critiques vary, alternatively portraying 
a largely untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use 
to expand their power and discretion or enforcers, beset with 
agency cost problems, that bring simple, easily resolved cases to 
create the appearance of vigorous enforcement. 
This Article has sought to close that gap by a careful 
analysis of insider trading enforcement data. The overall 
pattern that emerges from these data is clear. Enforcement 
authorities concentrate their efforts on cases involving 
unquestionable MNPI. For the most part, they focus on 
traditional fiduciary or other duties of trust and confidence, 
 
 441. See supra Table 2. 
 442. See supra Table 9 (showing that 34.5 percent of criminal cases and 
60.36 percent of noncriminal cases involved trading exclusive in common 
shares). 
 443. See supra Table 8 (showing that 38.06 percent of overall cases 
involved trading with friends and families). 
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although civil enforcement authorities appear more willing to 
expansively apply Rule 10b5-2. Both civil and criminal enforcers 
appear to focus their efforts on fairly routine cases of insider 
trading. Especially on the civil side, those cases typically are 
brought against mid-level employees and their friends and 
family, who have earned comparatively low profits usually in 
one-off transactions rather than through systematic insider 
trading schemes. These cases are routinely settled within days 
of filing. Enforcers infrequently bring claims against remote 
tippees and carve back on such cases when they perceive stricter 
scrutiny from the judiciary. There are significant differences 
between criminal and civil cases, with the former focusing 
largely on what appear to be more serious insider trading 
episodes.  
None of these data suggest any meaningful doctrinal 
overreach, and thus there seems little reason to define these 
elements more precisely via specific statutory language. Indeed, 
the pattern of cases suggests that market participants can 
anticipate with a fair degree of certainty the kinds of activities 
that will be subject to governmental enforcement, both civilly 
and criminally. And, if anything, the data suggest that the SEC 
focuses too many of its enforcement resources on the least 
sophisticated episodes of insider trading. The analysis here 
shows that the agency devotes a substantial portion of its 
resources to cases that it can anticipate will settle quickly and 
easily. These enforcement practices raise substantial concerns 
about the deterrent impact of the SEC’s insider trading cases. 
This Article has only begun to analyze insider trading 
enforcement and many questions remain unanswered. Future 
research, for example, can analyze how insider trading is 
punished and whether the panoply of available 
penalties— incarceration, supervised release, disgorgement, 
and civil and criminal fines—are employed consistently across 
defendants. To the extent that researchers can gain access to 
SRO referrals or SEC investigative files, they could better 
analyze how cases are selected for enforcement. A larger dataset 
extending over multiple administrations may also reveal the 
extent to which enforcement priorities shift over time.  
 
 
        
REAL INSIDER TRADING  1741 
 




Type Description Source 
Litigation 
Characteristics 
   
FINRA Categorical 1 if FINRA made a 




FBI Categorical 1 if the FBI or US 
Attorneys made a 







ORSA Categorical 1 if the Options 
Regulatory Authority 
made a referral to the 
SEC and 0 otherwise. 
SEC Litigation 
Releases 
Market Abuse Categorical 1 if the SEC’s Market 
Abuse Unit assisted in 




Lag Continuous Time in days between 
first alleged insider 
trading incident and 










Case Length Continuous Time in days from when 
the action is commenced 
until the final judgment 
(civil cases), sentencing 













Categorical Indicator variable for 
any of the following 
Bloomberg Dockets 
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potential enforcement 
types: (1) civil only; (2) 
criminal only; (3) SEC 
administrative action 
only; (4) civil and 
criminal; (5) civil and 
administrative; (6) civil, 
criminal, and 





   
Defendant Type Categorical Indicator variable for the 
following categories of 
defendants, defined 
through either their 
relationship to the 
source of the information 
or through their 
occupation: (1) Officers 
and Directors; (2) Other 
Employee; (3) Securities 
Market Professional 
(SMP); (4) Lawyer; (5) 
Other Professional; (6) 
Friends and Family; or 
(7) Other. Officers and 
Directors include only 
members of the board 
and the most senior 
executives of the firm, 
including the CEO, CFO, 
















        




Direct Profits Continuous The total profits the 
named defendant is 
alleged to have earned 
from improper insider 












Continuous The total profits of all 
traders who learned, 
either directly or 
indirectly, the MNPI 
from the named 
defendant in inflation-










   
Basis of 
Liability 
Categorical Activity in which 
defendant was alleged to 
have engaged: (1) 
trading; (2) tipping only; 
(3) trading after tip; and 








IT Events Continuous  The number of separate 
incidents of trading or 
tipping associated with 
each piece of MNPI in 
the defendant’s 
possession. For example, 
if the defendant learns a 
single piece of MNPI and 
trades on it, IT Events 
will be 1 regardless of 
how the trader divides 
up the trading activity. 
If the trader also tips a 
single individual, IT 
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Network Size Continuous The number of 
individuals participating 









Security Categorical Indicator variable 
defining the securities 
the defendant either 
purchased or sold: (1) 
common shares only; (2) 
options or other 
derivative securities; (3) 
a combination of 
common shares and 
options; or (4) no 
trading. The no trading 
category is used in two 
situations: (1) 
defendants who tip but 
do not trade or (2) 
defendants who do not 
trade for their own 
account. The latter 
category would include, 
for example, a hedge 
fund portfolio manager 
who traded for his or her 
fund but not for his or 
her own account. If the 
defendant had multiple 
insider trading events, 
only the largest trade 











Categorical 1 if there is any 
allegation of such 
conduct and 0 otherwise. 
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coded language or 
disposable cell phones, 





Level Continuous Measure of the 
defendant’s distance 
from the original source 
of the information. 0 
represents the original 
source of the 
information. 1 includes 
both direct tippees and 
those who 
misappropriate 









MNPI Categorical Indicator variable 




The categories are as 
follows: (1) M&A 
activity; (2) financial 
information; (3) product 
approval; or (4) other. If 
the defendant had 
multiple insider trading 
events, only the largest 
trade (measured by 








Industry Categorical Industry in which the 
company operated. If the 
defendant had multiple 
insider trading events, 
only the largest trade 




Duty Categorical In misappropriation 
cases, the nature of the 
SEC Complaint; 
SEC Order 
        





duty the defendant is 
alleged to have violated. 
The categories are as 
follows: (1) employment; 
(2) other traditional 
fiduciary duties 
(including, lawyer-client 
or doctor-patient); (3) 
family relationship; (4) 
friendship; (5) 
confidentiality 
agreement; or (6) other. 
Instituting 
Proceedings; 
Criminal 
Indictment or 
Information 
